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In recent years researchers from a variety of cognitive science disciplines have been 
challenging some of the core assumptions of the dominant cognitivist theoretical 
framework, including the abstract disembodied functionalism of information-processing 
models.  In its place an alternative situated cognition paradigm has gradually emerged, 
one which sees cognition as deeply embodied-embedded and no longer the sole product 
of information-processing brains. 

The extended mind hypothesis (EMH), proposed by Andy Clark and David Chalmers 
(1998) in the now famous "The Extend Mind" paper, offers one particular approach to 
this new conception of cognition.   In it the authors argue that, cognitive and mental 
processes are not exclusively located inside the cranium of individuals, but rather, are at 
times unbounded and constituted by bodily and environmental resources which agents 
routinely deal with.  However, exactly what cognition is, remains unaddressed. This 
dissertation takes this question as its point of departure.   

Thus EMH is read as being grounded upon two core motivations.  The first, more self-
evident motivation, relates to the extended nature of cognitive boundaries.  The second 
relates to the self-proclaimed challenge it makes on traditional cognitivists accounts of 
cognition.   

After an appraisal, it is concluded that the EMH remains deeply committed to 
cognitivism and as such, should be considered as part of traditional cognitive science 
rather than as an opposition to it.  Nonetheless, inspired by its two central motivations, it 
is proposed that these could be saved, if a location-neutral, non-cognitivist, non species-
specific "mark of the cognitive" can be provided.  The second half of this dissertation is 
then dedicated towards this goal. 

Drawing primarily from the work of  Jakob von Uexküll and the field of biosemiotics, I 
propose a conception of cognition as rooted in organismic life and as emergent from a 
biological autonomous agent's capacity for natural semiosis.  It is argued that cognition 
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is a natural biological process of goal-directed organism-environment systems striving 
for self-maintenance through sign-mediated adaptive functional cycles.  The most 
fundamental cognitive capacity a system can have, is the ability to read and interpret, 
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1 Not in the Head 
We routinely use external devices, props and tools to aid and support most of our daily 
activities.  We make notes on notebooks, use phones to save phone numbers, blackboard 
and chalk to work out complex equations and much more besides.  But, how are we to 
understand these particular activities?   More specifically, how are we to think about the 
cognitive processes underlying these activities.  Given the overtly distributed nature of 
these activities, a closely related question has recently resurfaced in cognitive science 
and philosophy of mind, where is the boundary between agent and environment to be 
drawn? 

Considerations regarding the bounds of the cognitive, received virtually no attention 
during the first few decades of cognitive science, where cognition was theorised 
exclusively in terms of "internal" computational processes implemented on neural 
machinery.  Moreover, these early conceptions of cognition also paid relatively little 
attention to either the agent's body or his interactions with the broader environment. 
However, partly inspired by the emergence of what in this work I call situated cognition 
(SC),  the question has once again resurfaced and become a serious matter of debate. 

Clark and Chalmers (1998) set the ball rolling by proposing the so-called "extended 
mind hypothesis" (EMH).  They argued that cognition was not exclusively located 
inside the head, but was at times constituted by bodily and environmental resources. 
For over a decade now, theorists inspired by the EMH (Clark, 1997, 2003, 2008; Clark 
& Chalmers, 1998; Hurley, 1998; Menary, 2007, 2010; Rowlands, 1999, 2010; Sutton 
2010; Wheeler, 2005; 2010; Wilson 2004; 2010) have carved out a niche in the 
philosophy of mind/cognition, by defending a position which goes very much against 
what had traditionally been considered to be the true bounds of cognition and cognition 
generally.  Accordingly, there are occasions when cognition is said to "extend" into the 
nonbiological environment.   

However, what remains ill addressed in this debate is; what exactly is cognition so that 
 8
it could be said to be extended? This dissertation attempts to address this question with 
one eye on the EMH debate. 

Thus, against this theoretical backdrop, the EMH is first understood as an approach to 
SC.  In the spirit of its revolutionary fervour, I read its central proposal as being 
grounded upon two core motivations.  The first, more self-evident motivation, relates to 
the extended nature of cognitive boundaries.  The second motivation, directly inspired 
by work in SC, relates to how it attempts to challenge traditional accounts of cognition. 

At this point I need to introduce a caveat.  This dissertation is not exclusively about the 
EMH, though it draws direct inspiration from one of its core motivations.  Here the 
EMH (or certain core aspects of it) is used more as a vehicle against which an 
alternative conception of cognition can be presented.  For these reasons this dissertation 
does not directly engage with all the trenchant warfare amongst critics and advocates of 
the EMH.  Indeed, as will soon become apparent, these issues cannot be resolved only 
dissolved.  I therefore sidestep some EMH-specific issues by arguing that the debate 
about boundaries, once properly understood, simply dissolve away. 

With this understanding of the proposal and caveat in hand, this dissertation then 
attempts to defend and further elaborate on, the second core motivation of the EMH to 
see if it can shed any light on the first.  Approaching the issue in this manner demands a 
shift of focus away from myopic concern over boundaries, towards considerations 
regarding the underlying nature of cognition itself.  What is it that makes systems 
cognitive in the first place.  We therefore first need an account of what cognition is 
before we can argue about where it is, we need a "mark of the cognitive" (MoC).    

A guiding premise of this work, argued explicitly in Chapters 3,5,6, is that the 
boundaries of living systems, are invariably fluid, dynamic and non-stable.  As a 
consequence I argue that, a central problem for the EMH debate is that, whether 
cognition extends or not, will always depend on the interests, motivations and goals of 
whoever is making the enquiring.  Appreciating these points, will go some way in 
showing that there is little benefit arguing about boundaries as such.  Nonetheless, the 
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particular understanding of cognition, the MoC one endorses, will inevitably inform 
how one  conceives of these boundaries.  

I begin by introducing two distinct theoretical approach to how cognition is currently 
understood within cognitive science.  In the second chapter we present the central tenets 
of the EMH and appraise it in relation to both SC and cognitivism.  I argue that the 
EMH is, what I call, a Janus-faced proposal.  This conclusion is inspired by the fact that 
the EMH is motivated by insights from SC, but clings to cognitivism.  From this 
analysis, I go on to align the EMH within traditional cognitivism and downplay its self-
proclaimed radicalness and revolutionary ambitions.  In the following chapter, I present 
arguments against the idea of static intrinsic boundaries and go on to  motivates why the 
EMH, and cognitive science more generally, needs a MoC.   

The following three chapters sketches out an alternative conception of minimal 
cognition designed to avoid the central tenets of cognitivism.  Drawing primarily from 
the work of  Uexküll and biosemiotics,  I propose a conception of cognition as rooted in 
organismic life and emergent from natural semiosis.  Meaning and signification is 
understood in terms of triadic sign-mediated processes, and is taken to be the 
fundamental feature of cognition.  Cognition is conceived as a natural biological process 
of goal-directed agents striving for self-maintenance, through sign-mediated adaptive 
functional cycles.   It is concluded that this understanding of cognition is relational, and 













What is Cognition 

Introduction 
Before discussing the EMH, some theoretical stage setting is required, this is the aim of 
this chapter. I provide an overview of the two dominant theoretical approaches to the 
study of cognition and unearth some core theoretical commitments. 

1 Cognitive Science 

1.1 - What is Cognition? 
What is cognition?  Although cognition is the central concept in the cognitive sciences, 
there is currently no universally accepted answer to this question.  Indeed, explicit 
conceptual interpretations are usually the subject of controversy (e.g. Brooks 1999; 
Dennett 1996; Clark 1997).  Cognitive scientists tend to rely on intuition and common 
sense to identify certain tasks, abilities, capacities etc, as cognitive and then propose 
mechanisms responsible for the performance of these tasks.  As Rowlands (2003. p, 
158) claims; "cognitive tasks are those tasks we say are cognitive. Cognitive processes, 
then, consist in those information-processing operations that are essential to the solution 
of cognitive tasks”.     1

A distinction between cognitive behaviours and cognitive processes might be helpful. 
Cognitive behaviours are those observable behavioural patterns manifested by observed 
systems.  Something is then ascribed cognitive status if it belongs to the class of 
cognitive behaviours.  This class is then picked out by identifying paradigmatic 
instances i.e., planing, reasoning etc.  Cognitive processes on the other hand, relate to 
the implementation of cognitive behaviours.  That is, cognitive processes are those 
processes or mechanisms, grounding cognitive behaviours.  

In so doing we end up with a list of prototypical behaviours which are ascribed 
cognitive status and which make up the cognitive domain.  This list includes a host of 
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!  Throughout this work I will refer to this standard manner of demarcating cognition as ascriptional.1
diverse phenomena, typically involving but not restricted to, believing, knowing, 
thinking, reasoning, planing, memory and language.  This amounts to taking up, what 
Dennett (1987) calls, an intentional stance. Which involves treating a systems as a 
rational agent and working out its behaviour in terms of its beliefs and desires. 

There is also strong, though perhaps tacit, consensus that cognition is best exemplified 
by human beings. Typically human (adult) cognition is the uncontested benchmark 
against which the abilities of other organisms are measured by.  Hence a tendency to 
focus on a small number of highly evolved and complex human-specific cognitive skills. 
Abilities which are then generalised to be the most plausible and fruitful guide to 
understanding cognitive phenomena.   Thus, for most cognitive scientists, human 
cognition provides the only unquestionable and uncontroversial example of what 
cognition is and so serves as the starting point into the enquiry.   I follow Lyons (2006) 
in referring to this species-centric approach to cognition as anthropogenic.  

From this perspective, cognition is tantamount to characteristically human-like 
capabilities such as reasoning, problem-solving and requires beliefs/desires. These 
processes have to be present to a significant degree before one can speak of a bona fide 
cognitive system (Gould & Gould 1998). Internal, representation-handling processes 
(see below) are considered to be the source of these particular thinking skills, and it is a 
matter of painstaking research to establish whether, and if at all, which creatures also 
exhibit these capabilities.  

We might note here already that this seems to imply a radical break from other living 
organism.  Although some complex animals such as primates and birds, can qualify as 
genuine cases of cognition or represent the borderline cases, it nonetheless depends to 
what extent these exhibit human-like qualities.  While, less complex organisms, such as 
invertebrates and single-celled organisms which are deemed incapable of such complex 
capacities, are not considered cognitively interesting. The behaviour of these types of 
organisms are usually regarded as the product of species-specific instincts or hard-wired 
reflexes which have little to do with cognition or agency (Godfrey-Smith 2002; Keijzer 
2001; Lyons 2006). True cognition is a scarce commodity here. 
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One further important consequence of adopting an unrestricted anthropogenic 
perspective, is that by exclusively focusing on highly evolved cognition, it devalues and 
marginalises other "less sophisticated" aspects of cognition.  In so doing it 
systematically encourages the assumption that, not only is there an intrinsic fact-of-the-
matter distinction between "basic cognition" and "cognition proper", but also, that one 
can understand cognition without having to pay much attention to these so-called "basic 
forms" of cognition (Keijzer 2001).  We revisit these issues in Chapters 4&6.   2

1.2 - Cognition in the Age of Computers 
Cognitive scientists are interested in explaining how cognitive processes  work.  Indeed, 
cognitive science emerged as an interdisciplinary attempt to systematically answer this 
question.  Bechtel and colleagues point out that the three main objectives of cognitive 
science is to provide an explanation of what cognition is, what it does and how it works 
(Bechtel et al. 1998).   To understand the answers it provides, we need to take a closer 
look at some of its underlying theoretical foundations. 

One of the defining characteristics of cognitive science, is that it proposes physical 
mechanisms for cognitive processes.  It offers a particular way of conceptualising and 
explaining the machinery responsible for cognition.  It does so by formalising and 
mechanising cognition and offering a naturalistic causal link between mentality and 
behaviour (Crane 1995).  By introducing mechanisms, cognitive scientists unite the 
cognitive domain, with observable behaviour.  It is at this point that the idea of mind/
brain as information-processing device enters the picture (Boden 2006; Bermúdez 
2010).  Here perceptions serve as input, action as output, and all "the things in between 
are the information processing" (Cisek 1999).  This particular conceptualisation of 
cognition, provides the answer to the what and as a consequence, the where of cognitive 
processes. 

The central idea behind the so-called "computer metaphor" is that, mind, stands in 
relation to the brain, as software to hardware in computers. Cognition just is a type of 
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!  In this work I follow standard practice and refer to lower level cognition as "basic cognition".  However, 2
the assumptions on which this distinction is premised are not accepted and outrightly reject.  My main 
issue is that the distinction seems to merely contribute to the neglect of other forms of cognition (see 
Chapters 4&6).
computation, understood as information-processing via the manipulation of symbolic 
(or subsymbolic in connectionism) representations.  Consequently; 

It became natural to think of human beings as information processing systems that 
received input from the environment (perception), process that information (thinking), 
and act upon the decision reached (behavior) (...) anything humans do could be viewed 
in information processing terms: reading, remembering facts, recognizing objects, 
drawing logical conclusions, solving difficult problems, playing chess...(Pfeifer & 
Scheier 1999, p. 37). 

It is this understanding of cognition which is now known as cognitivism (Wallace 2007). 
Ultimately, humans cognise by virtue of processing information in the form of inner 
symbolic representations, which represent an external mind-independent environment. 
These representational states are then manipulated using ‘rules’ (algorithms) resulting in 
relevant action. Cognition is segmented into a secession of stages, at each stage 
particular computational operations are performed on incoming information (Fodor 
1975; Pylyshyn 1984).   

These ideas are famously captured in the Physical-Symbol System Hypothesis, which 
holds that a system of this nature, implemented in a physical medium, “has the 
necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action” (Newell & Simon 1976). 
By "necessary" it was meant that any system which does not have these properties 
cannot be intelligent, and by "sufficient", it was implied that a system having these 
characteristics, had the potential to be intelligent     

This is a prime example of higher cognitive functions being mechanistically explained 
in terms of formal rule-based processing of internal symbols.  These symbols in turn are 
generally assumed to be inside the brain, analogous to a computer program (the 
software) being inside a computer (the hardware), whilst at the same time, body and 
environment are reduced to simple input/output devices.  

1.3 - Information Sheds its Materiality  
Implicit in cognitivism is a tacit endorsement of an inside/outside dichotomy inherited 
from Cartesian Dualism.  A dichotomy maintained by identifying an "inner" domain 
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populated by various mental states, such as beliefs, desires, thoughts, and other 
experiences, separate from an "outer" domain of raw physical goings-on available to 
sensation, the perceptual information that human sensory systems “take in".   

An extreme example, but nonetheless representative of the assumption, is found in 
Fodor's (1980) “methodological solipsism”, which is explicitly premised on the inside/
outside dichotomy, and proceeds by “methodologically” assuming the fundamental 
soundness of the boundary conditions supporting this division.  For Fodor, only by 
treating the mind as a more or less isolated and self-contained bounded unit, can we 
understand how it works.  Similarly, traditional cognitive science encourage us to think 
of an agent's cognitive behaviour as enabled by an isolated system that extracts 
information from the environment and encodes it so as to be used within an inner 
analytic domain. 

This dichotomy, conserved by cognitivism in the guise of the distinction between 
hardware and software, is theoretically grounded on metaphysical functionalism.  If 
mind is software, then it must be just like a program, which can be implemented on any 
kind of machine (Hayles 1999).  Mentality is therefore necessarily multiple realisable, 
meaning it can be implemented in multiple substrates.  Mind as software can run on any 
machine or hardware, what is crucial is the abstract causal relations between inputs, 
inner states and outputs, not what realises it (Pfeifer and Scheier 1999, p, 43). 

Consequently cognitivism became solely concerned with the software side of the 
distinction.  It focused on abstract disembodied information at the expense of embodied 
materiality.   As Neisser (1967) claims, cognitive scientists; “wants to understand the 
program, not the hardware”.   The ultimate conclusion reached was that  if the mind is 
an information-processor, then computers not only can help us model its activities, but 
also allow us to create artificial minds (Boden 2006). 

In sum, cognitivism demarcates the cognitive domain by ascription, takes human 
cognition as the benchmark for cognition in general and conceptualise it as rule-based 
symbol-involving information-processing. The brain is the seat of intelligence, 
cognition is centralised and anything outside of it, is considered a mere source of input.  
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1.4 - The "Traditional View" in Three Theses  
From our discussion above we can extract three separate, but interconnected theses, 
regarding the nature of cognition, as commonly demarcated by ascription. 

Firstly, cognition is the product of rational self-contained bounded units endowed with 
causally efficacious mental states, which perceives, plans and finally acts on the 
environment on the bases of these states.  Agent and environment are understood to be 
two ontological distinct categories (inner/outer) connected by these mental states. It 
emphasises the existence of a world qualitatively differentiated from the observing 
agent and preceding any cognitive act. This we can call the individualist thesis.   

Secondly, by building on the first thesis, cognitive agents are understood as 
computational information-processors, composed of modules which use internal 
symbolic (sub-symbolic in connectionism) representations, process these according to 
specified rules and produce relevant outputs.  Cognition is a process whereby 
information is "picked-up" from a mind-independent world, represented internally 
through symbolic data-structures, reasoned with and used for planing and acting in the 
world, knowledge is grounded in a "storehouse" of mental representations, which can be 
reliably called upon when required.  This we can call the computationalist thesis. 
   
Finally, more implicit and less explored than the other two but nonetheless ubiquitous, is 
that cognition considered as essentially brain-bound is primarily, if not exclusively, a 
human affair.  That is, human cognition forms the benchmark for what cognition in 
general is.  This is a methodological assumption which takes human psychology as its 
starting point.  We can call this the anthropogenic thesis.   

These three theses, taken together, form the theoretical core of traditional cognitive 
science.  I follow standard convention in referring to this approach as cognitivism.  For 
the rest of this dissertation I will work under the assumption that cognitivists, to a lesser 
or greater extent, are committed to all three theses, and as such, only by rejecting all 
three, can cognitivism be overcome. 
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2 Situated Cognition 

2.1 - Cognition in the Age of Robots  
Amidst all this high-level abstraction, it did not go completely unnoticed that cognitive 
agents are situated, physically embodied and in continuous dynamic interaction with 
their environment.  Indeed, it was an appreciation for these observations which inspired 
the development of the alternative research program of situated cognition (SC).   

More specifically, the SC movement emerged within cognitive science, as a direct 
challenge to some of the tenets of cognitivism.  The central focus of this research 
involves studying cognitive activity by examining the ways in which embodied agents 
relate to and interact with their environments. It changes the emphasis of searching for 
the cognitive inside the skull to exploring the dynamic relations that hold between 
organisms (constituted by brains & bodies) and their environments (Barrett 2011; 
Bickhard & Terveen 1995; Brooks 1999; Clark 1997; Dreyfus 1992; Franklin 1995; 
Hutto & Myin 2013; Noè 2004;  Pfeifer & Scheier 1999; Robbins & Aydede 2009; 
Shapiro 2011; Varela et al 1991). 

SC is a developing, rather than fully fledged research paradigm, nonetheless, it has some 
core tenets of its own (see, Anderson 2003; Calvo & Gomila 2008; Robbins & Aydede 
2009).  These have historical antecedents in two distinct but connected strands of 
research, one scientific the other philosophical.  The scientific strand stems from 
cybernetics and psychology, particularly the work of Ashby, Bateson, Vygotsky and 
Gibson,  all emphasised the reciprocity between perception, action and environmental 
feedback in cognitive processes (Dupuy 2000).  Similarly in philosophy, the views of 
Dewey, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger  stressed the role of the body and body-
environment interaction in perception and knowledge (Gallagher 2009).  

So situated cognition is not just a particular type of cognition which can be 
distinguished from non-SC.  Rather, as a loosely unified research program, theorists of 
SC argue that cognition is essentially situated and that any abstraction away from the 
environmental context in which it unfolds, will severely distort the phenomena under 
study.   Cognition not only evolved and adapted within an environment but it is also 
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shaped by and shapes it in return.  Moreover, cognition is not only situated but also 
essentially embodied.  Thus the particular structural constitution of a system itself 
deeply constrains, modulates and nontrivially contributes to cognition.   According to 
Anderson (2003); 

Instead of emphasizing formal operations on abstract symbols, this new approach focuses 
attention on the fact that most real-world thinking occurs in very particular (and often very 
complex) environments, is employed for very practical ends, and exploits the possibility of 
interaction with and manipulation of external props. It thereby foregrounds the fact that 
cognition is a highly embodied or situated activity—emphasis intentionally on all three—
and suggests that thinking beings ought therefore to be considered first and foremost as 
acting beings (ibid, p. 91). 

From the SC perspective, cognitivism focused too narrowly on programs and algorithms 
for specialised kinds of "off-line" thinking (in the head), such as abstract reasoning and 
logic, as a consequence "on-line" active cognation was completely neglected.  It is this 
narrow conception of cognition as detached and disembodied that SC challenges. 
Accordingly, cognition needs to be put "back in the brain, the brain back in the body, 
and the body back in the world" (Wheeler 2005, p 12).  Ultimately, cognition can no 
longer be understood exclusively in terms of disembodied abstract computations 
happening in the head. 

Note that this "movement" goes under various names and is associated with a motley of 
diverse notions and closely related ideas, such as; embodiment, enactivism,  distributed 
cognition, dynamic hypothesis,  sittuatedness and the extended mind.  Moreover, these 
ideas also go by a host of different labels including, but not restricted to;  "distributed 
cognition", "New AI",  "embodied cognitive science", "radically embodied cognitive 
science", etc (see Calvo & Gomila 2008; Chemero 2009; Robbins & Aydede 2009). 
Here however,  I opt for the umbrella term situated cognition (SC). The motivation for 
using SC rather than the more prominent "embodied" cognition is a partisan one.   

This is because a great deal of work currently done under the banner of "embodied 
cognition", does not in fact deal with the body in any meaningful way at all, nor offer 
any theory of embodiment as such (Froese & Ziemke 2009; Ziemke 2001; 2003; 2007). 
 18
Thus, the common usage of the terms embodied cognition, embodied cognitive science 
etc, seems inappropriate (Wilson 2002,   is a good example of this).  Given the neglect of 3
the body, SC seems to be a more appropriate label for the current state of the approach. 
Nonetheless, for the purpose of this work, although all of the above mentioned 
approaches difference in certain aspects with regards to this or that theoretical concept, 
they contain some commonalities, on which I shall focus. 

Following Robbins & Aydede (2009), I take SC as the genus and embodied, embedded, 
enactive and extended cognition etc, as species thereof.  That is, these species can be 
understood as distinct yet loosely connected approaches to SC  As already noted, these 
ideas are by no means homogenous nor all adhered to by everyone.  But, just as 
cognitivism has its theoretical core, so too can we identify a similar core to SC.  In 
particular there are three  ideas which are central and unifies most of the research, 
giving the program its underlying theoretical foundations.  These key tenets are, 
embodiment, embeddeness and extension.  Together they form the theoretical core of the 
genus of SC.  I introduce these next. 

2.2 - The Alternative View in Three Theses 
The first of these notions is embodiment.  The idea here is that cognition depends not 
only on brains but also essentially, non-trivially, on bodies.  Cognitive systems possess 
physical structures, other than brains or central processors, which enable them to 
navigate and negotiate their way around in the world.   Cognition is understood as being 
embodied through-and-through.  Call this the embodiment thesis. 

Secondly, cognitive systems inhabit a physical environment which they are part of and 
not merely an abstract mental space.  Cognition unfolds from a particular perspective, 
within a particular context in response to particular circumstances.  In these cases we 
routinely use and exploit external resources which structure and facilitate these 
processes.  These need to be considered and taken into account when thinking about 
cognition.  Call this the embedded  thesis.   
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!  In her review article (Wilson 2002) identifies six different views of "embodied cognition", only one 3
which explicitly addresses the role of the body (see Ziemke 2003).  
Leads straight to the view that the boundaries of cognitive systems are (at times) 
extended into the environment.  That is, some of the resources used by cognitive 
systems can become constitutive parts of the system itself and extend  cognition beyond 
the head.  Call this the extended mind hypotheses (EMH). 

Together, these loosely provide the theoretical underpinnings of the SC framework.   To 
a large degree, for SC the most fundamental of the three theses are  embodiment and 
embedding (Brooks 1999).  Some argue that by endorsing either of these one need not 
endorse the idea that cognition extends into the environment.   Accordingly, the 
extension thesis is said to be the most "radical" and also the least endorsed  by the wider 
SC community (Wilson 2002).  Indeed, cognitive extension is often used to distinguish 
between merely "embedded-embodied" views, which are argued by the EMH theorists 
to be the exclusive "conservative" purview of SC, and the more "radical" extended view 
(Clark 2008; Rowlands 2010; Wheeler 2011a; 2013).  Thus the EMH on its own is 
considered as a distinctive stand-alone approach to the study of cognition.   

For the purpose of this work we follow suite and take the EMH, as a distinctive 
approach to SC, in the same way that "embodied cognition" or "distributed cognition", 
can be understood as a distinctive approach to SC.  It is largely on this basis which we 
will appraise it.  This we will do in the next chapter. 

Conclusion  
The aim of this chapter was to introduce the notion of cognition and how it is 











The EMH In Context 

Introduction  
This chapter is divided into two interlinking halves.  The first introduces the EMH as 
advocated by Clark and Chalmers (C&C) in their 1998 paper The Extended Mind.  The 
second appraises the EMH in relation to cognitivism and SC  This appraisal will lead to 
the conclusion that the EMH is a Janus-faced proposal, in that it is motivated  by and 
portrays itself as a "radical" form of SC, yet clings on to traditional cognitivism.  

1 The Case For EMH 

1.1 - Extended Cognition 
As already noted, the idea behind the EMH   is that things other than brains, can 4
ontologically count as parts of a cognitive system. But how does this differ from the 
more standard SC claims?  The EMH self-consciously distinguishes itself from SC, 
claiming that embodied-embedded SC, is not "radical" enough. Due to the explicitly 
ontological nature of the perspective, it is hailed by proponents and critics alike, as a 
"radical" departure from, not only cognitivism, but also from SC itself (Adams & 
Aizawa 2008; Clark 2008a; Rowlands 2010; Rupert 2009; Wheeler 2010; 2011a; 2013). 
Here we explore some of its central arguments.   5

The EMH is an answer to a question posed by C&C;  "where does the mind stop and the 
rest of the world begin?".   Accordingly; 

The actual local operations that realize certain forms of human cognizing include 
inextricable tangles of feedback, feed-forward, and feed-around loops: loops that 
promiscuously criss-cross the boundaries of brain, body, and world. The local mechanisms 
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!  See Menary (2010) for a overview and representative sample of approaches to the EMH.4
!  Due to space constrains this work only addresses so-called "first-wave" approaches to the EMH (see 5
Menary 2007; 2010a,b,c; Sutton 2010). Nonetheless, all points made here, equally apply to the "second-
wave" approaches.  Elsewhere (De Jesus, under review) I have argued that second-wave approaches are 
also grounded on functionalism, and so, are inherently cognitivists. That said, this is an issue which 
cannot be addressed here
of mind, if this is correct, are not all in the head. Cognition leaks out into body and 
world" (Clark & Chalmers 1998. p,12 emphasis added). 

It postulates that the mechanisms of cognition sometimes extend beyond the skin. 
Consider a simple example, the use of pen and paper to solve a mathematical sum 
(Clark & Chalmers 1998; Wilson & Clark 2009; Rumelhart et al. 1986).  When faced 
with a simple sum, such as 7 x 7, most people can easily "see"' the correct answer. 
When it comes to longer multiplications however, the answer becomes difficult to "see". 
In these cases a standard strategy is to use pen and paper to work it out.  C&C (and more 
substantially Wilson & Clark) claim that, on the occasions  we use pen and paper to 
solve sums, the cognitive processes involved are literally extended into the world and 
the pen and paper form part of the cognitive machinery.  Pen and paper are constituent 
parts of the cognitive process not merely causal aids. 

Wilson & Clark offer several reasons for this ontological claim.  They point out that if I 
do the calculations without the aid of pen and paper, I would need to internally represent 
the figures and perform the entire calculation "in my head".  Had the task been 
performed in this "standard" manner, there would have been no hesitation in calling it a 
genuine cognitive process.   But, the task can also be performed by writing the 
intermediate results down and "off-loading" part of the cognitive routine onto the piece 
of paper. The numbers which would have had to be internally (in the head) represented, 
manipulated and stored, are externally represented, manipulated and stored.  As such, 
since pen and paper support and actively contribute to the off-loading, manipulation and 
storage of the information required for solving the calculation, they fulfil the same 
cognitive functions that short-term (internal) memory would in its absence.  Therefore, 
we should grant it cognitive status, as exclusive in-the-head processes. 

The use of external resources to perform a cognitive task (multiplication) aids, augments 
and constitutes our mathematical abilities.  Pen and paper can take over the function 
which would normally be performed by neural resources (i.e. short-term memory).   For 
this reason, Wilson & Clark argue cognitive processing extends into, is constituted by, 
these two external objects.  
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Consider doing a jigsaw puzzle.  Imagine how difficult this task would be if you 
couldn't physically interact with the pieces, without the ability to pick them up and 
manipulate them.   A traditionalist account of how one builds a jigsaw, suggests that for 
example, one first forms a mental image of the particular piece then mentally rotates it 
to establish its best fit.  All of which is implemented by computational processes in the 
brain.  However, taking the above ideas on board,  manipulating the pieces can do much 
of the work of internal cognitive processing.  As Wilson (2004) argues; 

We solve the problem by continually looking back to the board and trying to figure out 
sequences of moves that will get us closer to our goal, all the time exploiting the structure 
of the environment through continual interaction with it. We look, we think, we move. But 
the thinking, the cognitive part of solving the problem, is not squirreled away inside us, 
wedged between the looking and the moving, but developed and made possible through 
these interactions with the board (ibid, p. 194). 

Because we can physically manipulate the pieces much of the burden of internal mental 
imagery processing is relieved and extends cognitive processing beyond the brain.   

The distinction between cognitive behaviours and cognitive processes, introduced  in 
Chapter 1, can help further illustrate the idea.  Recall that cognitive behaviours are those 
observable patterns displayed whilst performing a particular cognitive task, such as 
calculation.  While the cognitive processes are the mechanisms responsible for that task. 
Traditionally these processes have been conceived as located entirely within  cognitive 
systems, but for the EMH, this is not always the case.  In some cases the cognitive 
processes, the mechanisms which realise cognition, partly extend beyond these 
boundaries and are constituted by extra-neural, extra-bodily resources. 

In sum, by "coupling" agent to environment, cognitive tasks are less computationally 
expensive than traditional (in-the-head) problem solving routines. They are 
computationally efficient in virtue of reducing the cognitive complexity and thus 
enabling the agent to solve less representation hungry problems. Furthermore, for the 
EMH theorist external resources are ontological constitutive parts of a larger integrated 
coupled cognitive system.  This claim in particular makes the EMH a constitutive thesis 
 23
rather than merely a causal one (more on which below) and is its essential core claim, 
that which sets it apart from merely embodied-embedded SC. 

1.2 - Extended Minds 
Having introduced some arguments for the extension of cognitive processes, we now 
turn to the extension of mental states.  C&C (ibid. p,12) point out that, even if cognitive 
processes are extended, this does not guaranty that mental states "extend".  The view 
that cognitive processes extend into the world is compatible, so maintain C&C, with an 
internalist position arguing that such mental states as believes, desires and emotions 
occur exclusively in the brain.  So, C&C present an argument which aims to convince us 
that a certain class of mental states, primarily propositional attitudes (including the 
vehicles thereof), are also not bound by the boundary of skin and skull.   
    
C&C offer the following thought experiment.  Inga, a NY native, is an avid art lover 
who frequently visits art museums.  While reading her local paper, she sees an advert for 
an art exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA), which she likes the look of. 
Recalling that MOMA is on 53rd Street, she gets ready and promptly walks there. Inga's 
behaviour can be understood in terms of personal level mental contents, we can say that 
Inga believed that MOMA was in 53rd and desired to go there.  Imagine another NY 
resident, Otto who has a form of mild dementia, which impairs his memory.  In order to 
combat this impairment, Otto always carries with him a notebook in which he writes 
new and relevant information.  When Otto needs to access some old information, he 
simply looks in his notebook.  Now, Otto also happens upon the same advert and like 
Inga, also  desires to go and see it.   He promptly looks in his notebook, sees that 
MOMA is in 53rd Street, and off he goes. 

For C&C, this thought experiment shows that Otto's use of the notebook, counts as a 
genuine case of an extended mental state, that of belief.  To make this clearer, let us 
consider the status of Inga's belief.  It seems plausible here to claim that Inga believed 
that MOMA was in 53rd Street, before she consulted her memory.  So from the first 
time she learned that MOMA was on 53rd Street she held this belief.  The distinction 
between dispositional and occurrent will help here.  A dispositional belief is a belief one 
has but is not currently entertaining, while an occurrent belief, is one which is brought 
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forth to consciousness.  Thus, Inga's belief becomes occurrent when she remembers it 
but she does not stop believing it when it becomes dispositional. 

Next, C&C argue that Inga's biological memory and Otto's notebook are essentially on a 
par with each other, 

...entirely analogous: the notebook plays for Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga. 
The information in the notebook functions just like the information constituting an ordinary 
non-occurrent belief; it just happens that this information lies beyond the skin (ibid) 
If someone asks Inga whether she knows where MOMA is, she says its on 53rd Street. 
Similarly, when Toto who is Otto's friend, asks if he knows where MOMA is, Otto 
automatically takes out his notebook, locates the address and proceeds to tell Toto that it 
is on 53rd Street. The point is that, both the notebook and biological memory play 
exactly the same functional role with regards to guiding behaviour, although one is 
located within the brain the other in the world. 

1.3 - Constitution 
We noted that the EMH is a constitutive thesis which argues that the coupling between 
internal processes with external resources form a unitary coupled system.  Thus, 

In these cases, the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way 
interaction, creating a  coupled system  that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own 
right (Clark & Chalmers 1998). 
  
It is important then, to be clear on exactly what sort of claims are being made here.  The 
arguments above are not claiming that cognitive processes which extend into the 
environment are completely external (more in the following chapter).  Rather, the idea is 
that these processes are "hybrid" processes (Rowlands 1999) which incorporate both 
internal and external components in its overall functioning, hence coupling.  Moreover, 
these hybrid processes are constitutive cognitive process made of inner and outer 
components.  External resources, do not merely causally aid cognition (although 




This should clarify why the distinction between, merely causal and ontologically 
constitutive, is crucially important for the EMH.  It is this distinction which is claimed 
sets the EMH apart from other SC. From the perspective of the EMH, SC amounts to 
the assertion of partial extension, and thus less radical than the EMH. The EMH theorist 
thinks of SC's theorist as simply stopping functional extension at the boundary of the 
body.  Many theorists might have no qualms with the idea that external resources 
causally contribute to cognition. Indeed, some of these theorists incorrectly think that 
this is all there is to SC (cf. Adams & Aizawa 2008; Rupert 2009).  So, although we 
might in some important ways crucially depend on external resources to support 
cognitive activities, this does not imply that cognition is constituted by these structures, 
cognition remains in the head. 

To strengthen their claims, C&C supply the following criteria for the constitution thesis. 
(1) All the components in the system play an active causal role.  (2) These jointly 
govern behaviour in the same sort of way that cognition usually does.  (3) If we remove 
the external components, the system's behavioural competence will drop, just as it 
would if we removed part of its brain (adapted from Menary 2010c. p, 3).  Therefore, 
environmental components play an active role in the present here-and-now,  not only in 
influencing but also constituting our cognitive performances.  Were we to maintain 
internal structures as they are but alter the nature of our environment, chances are our 
behaviour and cognitive competencies would change dramatically.  Sometimes external 
resources are as constitutively relevant as internal brain processes.   

However, by itself, this criteria is not sufficient to establish whether a particular coupled 
system is cognitive as such.  There are certainly plenty of coupled systems which are 
clearly not cognitive.  A thermostat for example; one might argue that it is coupled with 
the room and temperature.  All the components in this system jointly play a role in its 
functioning.  Removing a component of this system would surely impede it from 
performing its intended function.  Nonetheless, this system is arguably not cognitive. 
The question now is; how and why are we to establish when a coupled system is 




1.4 - Parity  
If location no longer provides the criterion for what is and isn't cognitive, then what 
does?  In order to determine whether external resources count as a part of a larger 
cognitive process, and which kinds of coupling constitute genuine cognitive systems, 
C&C offer, as a guide, what has become known as the parity principle (PP).  The PP 
suggests that; 

If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done 
in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognising as part of the cognitive process, 
then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process. Cognitive 
processes ain't (all) in the head! (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 8). 

The PP has been notoriously difficult to interpret and the source of plenty confusion. 
Unsurprisingly really, since on a first reading, it appears contradictory.  On the one 
hand, the principle claims to provide a non bias location-neutral principle to demarcate 
the cognitive.  Whilst on the other hand, it argues that "were it done in the head", then 
we should consider it cognitive.  Thus suggesting that the true benchmark of the 
cognitive are internal brain processes after all (Di Paolo 2009; Gallagher 2009; Walter 
2010). 

On a more charitable reading, the PP suggests that if the external structures that 
underwrite the process were inside the head, we would have no problem claiming the 
process to be cognitive (Clark 2008a, p.114).  Naturally, C&C do not mean that external 
structures can literally be present in the same form inside the head.  Pen and paper used 
to perform calculations, or Otto's notebook, is not literally implanted inside the head. 
What C&C have in mind is a parity of function between a cognitive process that uses a 
part of the world outside the head and a cognitive process that occurs solely inside the 
head.  Calculating using pen and paper, which is an external process in the cognitive 
task, is functionally isomorphic with calculation inside the head, which is an internal 
process.  As we have no problem describing the latter process as cognitive, we should 
therefore have no problem describing the former process involving pen and paper also 
as a cognitive process. Thus understood, the location of a process should be irrelevant 
to its potential status as cognitive, functional role is what matters most 
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Evidently the PP is a functionalist principle,   Given that the EMH argues that 
nonbiological resources form part of wider cognitive system, adopting a functionalist 
view of the mind makes issues regarding the particular material nature of these 
processes, instantly less pressing.  In this sense at least, functionalism of a sufficiently 
liberal type, can be seen as something of an "ideal" theoretical framework.  Recall that 
functionalism characterises the mind in terms of a substrate neutral network of causal 
input-output relations. Individual mental states/cognitive processes, are characterised by 
their function, or the role they play, within this system of inputs and outputs (Block 
1980).  However, nothing stops these input-output relations from spreading out across 
brain, body and the world.  Indeed, this seems to be a natural implication of this 
doctrine (cf. Sprevak 2009; Wheeler 2010). 

According to C&C, whether a state counts as a belief, is in part, determined on the basis 
of the causal/functional role it performs. It is irrelevant where the substrate of this causal 
role is located.  It can be located within the confines of the biological body, or span the 
brain, body and world boundary. The point is that, for C&C, what makes something a 
belief is the causal relations it entertains to inputs, outputs and other mental states, not 
the physical substrate. The Otto example is particularly instructive in this respect, 
because it appears to provide strong theoretical support for this claim, showing that 
beliefs, a paradigmatic case of mental states, can supervene on mechanisms that are 
distributed across brain, body, and world 

The exact location of the physical realisation of the functional role is irrelevant to the 
functional level of description. Since the notebook is functional isomorphic to Inga's 
memory, by dint of parity, we have no justification in denying Otto's belief as being (in 
part) extended beyond the skull.  The only thing that would prevent us from doing so is, 
according to C&C, an internalist bias.   The entries in Otto's notebook should be 
understood as dispositional beliefs just as the ones in Inga's biological memory because 
they equally guide behaviour and are functionally equivalent, by parity, Otto plus 
notebook constitute a coupled system.   
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Some critics however (Adams & Aizawa 2008; Ruppert 2004, 2009; Sprevak 2009) 
have noted that advocating such liberal (functionalist) conceptions of cognition are so 
permissive that any external process is potentially cognitive, overextending the mind 
and leading to "cognitive bloat" (Rowlands 2009).  To deal with this issue, C&C provide 
some additional criteria, the "glue and trust" conditions which external processes have 
to meet in order to be considered as proper parts of a cognitive system.  

1) That the external resource be reliably available and typically invoked.  2) That any 
information thus retrieved be more‐or‐less automatically endorsed. It should not usually be 
subject to critical scrutiny (unlike the opinions of other people, for example). It should be 
deemed about as trustworthy as something retrieved clearly from biological memory.  3) 
That information contained in the resource should be easily accessible as and when 
required. (Clark 2008a. p, 79)  

The extra criteria are offered as a means of tightening up the over permissive liberal 
functionalism which grounds PP.   The details of the debate surroundings the EMH and 
functionalist is not significant for my overall thesis, the only point to bare in mind is that 
by in large, the EMH is defended in functionalist terms (but see Menary 2007; Sutton 
2010). 

In sum, the EMH draws a distinction between mind and cognition and defends the idea 
that, sometimes these internal processes are not only augmented by external resources, 
but constituted by them.  It maintains that to understand cognition, we need to recognise 
not only how we interact with the outside world, but also how aspects of the 
nonbiological world are, in certain situations, actually constitutive parts of mentality. 
Unlike cognitivism, cognition should no longer be considered a heady affair, and unlike 
SC, it is more than an embodied-embedded affair - its extended! 

2 The Janus-Faced Nature of the EMH 
The aim of this section is to show that the EMH is a variant of cognitivism which makes 
it a Janus-faced proposal.  It draws inspiration from the SC framework yet clings to 
cognitivism. We therefore appraise it in retaliation to both cognitivism and SC.  My 
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central concern here is not to address any of the well documented criticisms of the 
EMH, but only to illustrate that it is best understood as a cognitivist proposal.   6

2.1 - SC or Cognitivism? 
So, what exactly are we to make of this account of cognition?  How does it relate to SC 
and cognitivism, are the cries of radicalness and novelty merited?  Having introduced 
some of its central arguments, we are now better placed to elaborate our claim that it is a 
Janus-faced proposal.  But what exactly do we mean by this?  The general idea stems 
from the observation that the EMH is at once motivated by SC yet remains fully 
committed to cognitivism.  This will strike most, as at best odd, and at worse 
contradictory.  How can I present the EMH as an approach to SC yet claim that it clings 
to traditional cognitivism?   

As we will now see, although C&C claim to find traditional cognitivism inadequate, it is 
nonetheless also clear that they remain equally committed to it.  Alas, these 
inadequacies lie solely with the cognitivist conservative boundary drawing. 
Nonetheless, it continues to hold on to all its major theoretical assumptions and 
commitments. The three theses of traditional cognitivism identified in the Chapter 1 get 
incorporated into the EMH. It is the purpose of this section to justify this observation. 

2.1.1 - EMH & Individualism Thesis 
While it is certainly true that the EMH makes some gallant attempts at conceptually 
freeing itself from the clutches of dualistic thinking in cognitivism, it is equally true that 
it falls somewhat short off the mark.  The central issue is that, in its negative 
formulation it depends on and derives from, taking the Cartesian way of thinking as 
coherent.  To argue that the mind is extended in this manner, is to merely redraw the 
spatial boundary, rather than to dissolve or question it.  It does not make any attempts to 
question the very foundations of centuries of study on the nature of cognition.   

The theoretical landscape of the EMH debate presuppose and preserves the dualism of 
an inner/outer dichotomy.  Assuming that the terms ‘‘inside” and ‘‘outside”, are 
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!  In Chapter 4 sect 2.2, I offer some reasons why it fails as a general account of cognition.6
meaningful and unambiguous.  In so doing it commits itself to the individualism thesis. 
This is further evident in the fact that, proponents of the EMH continue to take brain 
processes as the true locus of cognition, only occasionally do these get extended.  Here 
the central core of cognition continues to be the product of mostly "isolated" bounded 
individuals, or more accurately, their mental states, which occasionally extend (Clark 
2008a,b; Wheeler 2011a). 

Thus the problem with the EMH, particularly as a self-proclaimed alternative to 
cognitivism,  is that it simply continues to preserve the Cartesian inner/outer dichotomy, 
and with it its grounding assumption that, the basic way of relating to the world is 
through propositional representations (cf, Dreyfus 2007; Gallagher 2011).  As Gallagher 
(2011)  points out, the EMH preserves a model of mind which it claims to want to reject. 
Thus the three criteria used to tighten up the PP and fed-off cognitive bloat,  are worked 
out in terms of beliefs then generalised to all cognitive processes. Cognition is 
predominantly constituted by beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes conceived 
in terms of representations and informational states.  The Otto thought experiment is a 
paradigm example of this commitment to the individualism thesis.  Cognition is here 
portrayed as the product of a rational self-contained bounded unit endowed with 
causally efficacious mental states, who perceives, plans and finally acts on the 
environment on the bases of these states.  Otto's behaviour is guided by these 
representational states and nothing else. 

So, while the EMH challenges traditional intuitions regarding where the boundaries of 
the mind and cognition should be drawn, it does not challenge much else.  In essence 
then, the EMH is simply a thesis about boundaries.  With this issue as its central 
concern, the underlying traditional cognitivist intuitions regarding what cognition is, 
simply falls out of the radar.   Consequently, traditional bias, intuitions and prejudices 
simply get incorporated into its own "extended" position.   

Ultimately, what C&C have done is preserve the traditional understanding of cognition 
in terms of discrete mental states causally governing behaviour, but simply placed these 
outside the head.  However, the conceptual/theoretical machinery remains the same, 
only the location of these states have changed.  
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2.1.2 - EMH & Computationalism Thesis 
The computationalist thesis is the most prominent and explicitly endorsed thesis out of 
all three cognitivist theses.  To see this, we simply need to note, evident already in the 
above discussion, that the EMH is articulated within the conceptual framework of the 
computational/functionalist theory of mind.  Clark himself is rather clear on this issue, 
as he remarks in defence of EMH; 

...computational, representational, information-theoretic, and dynamical approaches (are 
all) deeply complementary elements in a mature science of the mind (Clark, 2008a p. 24, 
emphasis in original). 

The commitment to the computational thesis is also particularly evident in C&C routine 
use of such notions  as "computations", "information-processing", "representations" and 
"functional roles", all of which are key concepts used in the cognitivist paradigm.  Once 
again, mind and cognition is taken as theorised by standard cognitivism, and then 
extended outwards. 

But cognition remains a computational information-processing enterprise, a matter of 
the right functional organisation.  Knowledge is grounded in a "storehouse" of either 
mental or external representations, which can be reliably called upon when required to 
guide goal-directed behaviour. Inline with traditional cognitivism information-
processing is taken to be the essence of thought and cognition.  But for the EMH 
theorist some of this information processing just happens (sometimes) to be realised 
beyond the brain.   In other words, it is traditional cognitivism, but extended.  The 
cognitivists conceptual framework, along with its grounding assumptions of mind and 
cognition, thus remain completely intact and critically unchallenged. 

Again the Otto thought experiment strikingly epitomises these guiding intuitions and the 
model of cognition underpinning it.   Evidently C&C implicitly take the mind to be a 
kind of repository for propositional attitudes and information.  The notes in Otto’s 
notebook are very much like files in a filing cabinet.   This model suggests that memory 
is some kind of store, from which records are retrieved.  On this view, memories are 
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stored static representations which represent the original event, these representation in 
turn provide a causal link between that particular episode and a person's ability to 
remember it.  Put simply, this is nothing but GOFAI (Haugeland 1985) in its purest 
form.  Not that Clark himself seems to mind, since he freely admits that the “mind is 
essentially a thinking or representing thing" (ibid. p, 149, emphasis added). 

2.1.3 - EMH & Anthropogenic 
Finally, evidently the EMH is also thoroughly committed to an anthropogenic approach 
to cognition.  This should come as no surprise, given that it is at its core cognitivists and 
as we have seen, cognitivism is itself deeply anthropogenic.  Like most traditional 
accounts of cognition, the EMH take (adult) human cognition as its starting point.  Thus 
cognition always amounts to highly sophisticated cognitive skills such as language, 
decision-making, and problem-solving.   Indeed, the majority of examples offered as 
support for the EMH are those of highly complex human cognitive capacities.   

Cognition below the level of humans is seldom acknowledged.  In so doing, the EMH 
continues to perpetuate a distinction between basic cognition and higher levels of 
cognition.  Consequently, implicitly implying that cognition can be understood without 
having to understand basic forms of cognition and that cognition is simply, a human-
only affair (see Menary 2010 for a representative collection). 

In conclusion, we appear to have a good case for understanding the EMH as a type of 
cognitivism. It assumes and defends a model of the mind which it incorrectly claims to 
be challenging.  It does not sufficiently challenge nor does it offer a "radical" alternative 
to cognitivism, it merely extends it.  As Shapiro (2011) notes, the  most fruitful way to 
understand the EMH is as a type of, what Wilson calls, "wide computationalism". This 
is a view which, despite what some might think, is completely compatible with the 
mainstream cognitivism.  Note also that, like cognitivism, cognition is demarcated by 
ascription. 

Taking this into account, I suggest that the EMH is then best seen as supplementing 
traditional cognitivism rather than as a principle argument against it  (Chemero 2009; Di 
Paolo 2009; Dreyfus 2007; Gallagher 2011).  As such, it is a mistake to see it as 
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competing  with cognitivism, as most critics of the EMH argue (Adams & Aizawa 2001, 
2008; Fodor 2009; Rupert 2004, 2009).   

2.2  - EMH & SC 
But what about its relation to SC more generally?  Ultimately, it proposes a 
reconciliatory picture,  but as we have seen the insights from SC are simply integrated 
into the old cognitivist model, where representations and computations are still the 
keystone of cognition, and mental processes keep their platform-free privilege. Only 
now the body and the environment are as important participants as the brain is.  And 
while there might be merit to such a position, it needs to be kept in mind that, it just ain't 
non-cognitivist! 

We are now better placed to see the Janus-faced nature of the EMH.  On the one hand, 
the EMH as presented here was greatly inspired and motivated, by the development of 
SC as a research program.  To a large extent, it is the development of SC which 
ultimately opened up the intellectual space for the EMH to be articulated, defended and 
generally understood.  Thus, regardless of how it sees itself in relation to SC, the EMH 
has its roots within it.  However, having exposed some of its theoretical assumptions, it 
should now seem less radical and more common place.  Thus understood, one of the 
central motivation for endorsing the EMH in the first place, the conviction that 
traditional accounts of cognition had outlived its usefulness, an insight stemming from 
SC, gets completely eroded.   7

In sum, the EMH as a distinct approach to SC remains deeply in the shadow of 
cognitivism.   Due to its unquestioned assumptions about what cognition is, its claims 
amount to little more than functional analyses of the various ways humans interact 
external resources in order to reason, seek out information, make plans etc.  Even 
though the EMH has revised the boundaries of cognition this has not in actual fact 
changed the underpinning cognitivist framework it wanted to undermine. Therefore, 
initial appearances notwithstanding, the EMH remains a cognitivist doctrine.   
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!  It is worth noting that the relationship between other approaches to SC and cognitivism, isn't entirely 7
straight forward either.  Suffice it to say that, there is in fact lots of reasons to think that most of SC 
amounts to little ells than dressed-up cognitivism, but this cannot be pursued here  (see, Chemero 2009; 
Hutto 2011a; Hutto & Myin 2013).
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to present the EMH and highlight its true Janus-face.  It was 
argued that despite initial appearance, the EMH remains a form of cognitivism which 



























Motivating The MoC 

Introduction 
The central aim of this chapter is to motivate the request for a "mark of the 
cognitive" (MoC).   But contrary to current debates, I present some reasons for 
understanding this request as an opportunity to question traditional cognitivism not to 
settle boundary disputes.  I begin by arguing that disputes about boundaries are counter 
productive which can only be dissolved not resolved.  I then explore the MoC with 
regards to current debates within the EMH.  I conclude by introducing preliminary 
requirements for an alternative MoC. 

1 Bound by Boundaries. 
Before we can address issues to do with a MoC, we first need to reconsider the nature of 
boundaries.  At the end of the previous chapter we argued that the EMH is mostly 
concerned with boundary issues.  But if the EMH is understood as merely the redrawing 
of a special kind of boundary, then one might legitimately wonder how much is truly 
gained from this. Is there any benefit from endorsing an extended cognitivism?  In this 
section, I argue the answer is no and provide some reasons for why arguing about 
boundaries, is not only unhelpfully distracting but can only end in aporia. 

1.1 - Unbounded by Boundaries  
A common assumption held by both proponents and critics of the EMH is that there are 
fixed boundaries to the cognitive.    This is the case even though the proponents of the 8
EMH argue that sometimes these boundaries extend into the world.    As we saw, it is 
this preservation of the Cartesian inner/outer dichotomy  that saddles the EMH with the 
individualism thesis.   However, the idea of living systems with fixed intrinsic boundary, 
has proven to be a somewhat problematic assumption (Bateson 1972).   
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!  This is simply a natural consequence of assuming that cognition is an object (as opposed to process) and hence 8
spatially located.  This assumption is challenged in the following chapters.
Dominique Chu (2011) has made a good case that all complex adaptive systems (CAS), 
systems with rich and diverse connections to the environment, are by their very nature 
"radically open" and cannot have fixed boundaries.    These systems are self-organising, 9
meaning that they are composed of subcomponents forming dynamic networks of 
mutual interactions, which give rise to emergent properties (order & structure) not 
found among, nor capable of being deduced from, the underlying subcomponents 
(Holland 1999). They evolve and spontaneously regulate their behaviour so as to adapt 
and cope with ongoing changes in its surrounding environment through multiple 
feedback loops  (Érdi 2008; Juarrero 1999; Mitchell 2009). Such systems range from 
cells, to crowds and societies and are always evolving, dynamic and radically open. It 
has become apparent that drawing neat boundaries around these systems is nearby 
impossible. This becomes particularly evident when such systems are modelled. 

To model a particular CAS, a researcher will first present a "semantic model" which 
describes the system, then a process of abstraction will ensue, leading to "formal 
models". This process inevitably involves a normative dimension, as the researcher must 
make choices, judgements, and assumptions when deciding on the factors that are 
relevant to the model. The modeller is always faced with a choice as to what to include 
and what to leave out from the model and consequently where the boundaries are to be 
drawn.  Where boundary are placed will depend on the nature of the enquiry, what needs 
to be known and ultimately who wants to know and for what purpose.  It depends on the 
goals and aims of the researcher not on any further fact of the matter.  Ultimately, the 
boundary between system and world is simply a pragmatic one which will change case 
by case depending on the purpose and aims of the enquiry (Bateson 1972; Rockwell, 
2005; Susi et al 2003). 

Fixed boundaries then seem to simply be observer relative.  Some will argue that all this 
shows is the epistemic difficulty to modelling and nothing about the ontological status of 
boundaries themselves.   There are however also reasons to doubt this. 
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!  CAS's are also dynamic, open and far-from-equilibrium, meaning that they exchange energy and matter 9
with the environment in order to maintain stability.  This topic is further discussed in Chapter 5&6.
Alan Rayner (1997) for example, observes that living systems (a type of CAS) are not 
composed of a series of discretely bounded units.  A careful study of the physical nature 
of living systems presents plenty of reasons for thinking that fix boundaries would 
simply be catastrophic. As Rayner illustrates through countless examples, the 
boundaries that appear to separate one organism from another, one cell from another, 
are, and essentially need to be, fluid, dynamic and utterly context-dependent.  A cell 
membrane for example, is not there simply as fixed barrier or a kind of "container", 
rather, it expands, contracts and is able to dynamically adapt to ongoing change. It is 
porous, allows inside and outside environments to mingle and flow together.   

Similarly, at a higher-level, an organism’s boundary needs to be equally dynamic, since 
organisms of all kinds are embedded in complex webs of relational interdependence, 
which are essentially required for their survival. Indeed, since living systems are in 
effect defined by the types of relations they can enter into, if you can draw an absolute 
boundary around them,  then they cannot be interacting and changing, but if it is 
changing then it cannot have an absolute fixed boundary.   The same principle should 
apply to any cognitive system in general. Living organisms as a type of CAS (see 
chapter 5&6), are constantly on the move, they have varying goals, needs, desires, 
values and purposes which change on a moment-to-moment basis, all of which require 
complex skilful navigation of the environment.  By virtue of this skilful navigation, this 
exploration and goal-directed behaviour, such systems demand fluid boundaries.  

If we take these considerations into account, it suggests that there is very little point in 
disputing where exactly the boundaries of cognition are to be drawn, as they are 
impossible to truly pin down.  As such, they will always be constrained and dependent 
on the nature of the enquiry.  And if this is the case, then there is no, there can never be, 
a fact of the mater regarding the boundaries of cognition.  It is not a dispute that can be 
settled by argument nor by empirical investigation.  As long as it is simply a dispute 
about boundaries, a stalemate will ensue. And here is the problem, since what sets the 
EMH apart from other approaches to cognition, is its particular taken on boundaries. 
Without the boundary dispute there would be no EMH. 
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So where does this leave the EMH?  If all it has to offer is a redrawing of a boundary, 
then it seems unclear how beneficial it is.  Even more so now we have argued that 
boundaries are in fact pragmatically drawn.  If we accept this, then much of the debate 
surrounding the EMH simply dissolves. What we can salvage is the intuition that 
traditional cognitivism needs to be challenged. This I believe is an insight worthy of 
pursuit, but one which, due to its cognitivist leanings, the EMH has been incapable of 
achieving.   This intuition has been eroded by the ensuing debate's myopic focus on 
boundaries.   

What these brief remarks on boundaries ultimately suggest is that a non-cognitivist 
account of cognition, unlike the EMH, cannot be bounded by boundaries.  Therefore the 
focus needs to shift from arguing about where boundaries should be drawn, to questions 
about what cognition is. If we do so, then we might be able see, insofar as the locution 
actually makes any sense, where cognition is, but, we also dissolve the EMH dispute. 
What this shift of focus ultimately implies, is a demand for a "mark of the 
cognitive" (MoC). A principle of demarcation for establishing what makes systems 
cognitive in the first place.  

2 The EMH & The MoC 
Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa (A&A) have for several years now, been staunch critics of 
the EMH.  Here I use their MoC argument to frame the issues of the MoC in general, 
and  recast their demand for a MoC, as a call to reexamine intuitions about the nature of 
cognition itself.   

2.1 - Why a MoC? 
Lets first look at how the MoC is debated within the EMH literature. Some 
commentators have noted that the fact that there is such an intense  debate regarding the 
boundaries of cognition, bears testament to the lack of a universally agreed upon MoC. 
The idea being that, if there was an established consensus on what cognition was, then 
as a natural consequence, we would find it easier to know where it was too (Adams 
2010; Adams & Aizawa 2001; 2008; Rupert  2004; 2009; 2010;  Weiskopf 2010) 
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Stemming from this observation, one of A&A's main argument against the EMH,  is that 
it fails to provide any adequate demarcating criteria which would ultimately show that 
cognitive processes are extended.   How can the EMH theorist argue, they ask, that 
cognition extends beyond the skull, if he does not specify a way of identifying instances 
of cognition.  As they point out;  "The bounds of cognition must be determined by 
finding the mark of the cognitive, then seeing what sorts of processes in the world have 
the mark" (2001, p. 46).  For A&A it is clear that external resources simply do not have 
these properties.  
   
Clark (2008a, p. 87) disagrees, he thinks that we can and should proceed without a 
MoC, arguing that the very requirement is misguided.  The reason is that asking how 
external resources are cognitive, as A&A do, is cleanly wrongheaded.  It is not that they 
are cognitive or non-cognitive, but that they play a role in cognitive routines.  Therefore, 
A&A are wrong to deny external resources cognitive status.  Given that memory for 
example, is already established as a cognitive process, there is nothing further to add 
because the nature of the cognitive process has already been assumed.  Clark's point is 
that, there is a distinction to be made between, what makes a process cognitive and what 
the constituents of that cognitive process are. This being the case, external resources 
involved in extended cognitive processes,  need not display properties exhibited by the 
system as a whole. 

Although there is something correct about Clark's reply, it does not fully address A&A's 
deeper point.  That is, to provide a MoC, just is to provide a criterion for what makes 
something a proper part of some cognitive routine that can be fulfilled by external 
objects.  Granted that external tools do not have the same properties as brains, what is it 
about coupled systems (tools-n-all) that makes them cognitive?  Walter & Kästner 
(2012) similarly argue that the EMH really does need a MoC.  These theorists point out 
that, contrary to Clark's own protestations, when it comes to the EMH, the issue of a 
MoC acquires an added sense of urgency.  The basic argument, is as follows: either we 
have an adequate account of what cognition is or we do not.  If we do, then the debate is 
easily resolved and there should be no further need for a drawn out dispute over 
boundaries.  On the other hand, if we do not, then the debate is clearly pointless, 
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because we will not know what we are talking about.   And without knowing we simply 
will be incapable of settling the dispute.  

All these arguments suggest that, what Clark and the majority of EMH theorists fail to 
see is that, this issue can only be settled by providing an independently motivated 
account of what makes a process cognitive.     10

Now, although there is something right about this suggestion, it misses the mark 
somewhat.  The focus needs to first shift away from boundaries.  As Di Paolo (2009, p. 
10) puts it: "Before asking where it is we must first say what it is".  But, if we take our 
discussion regarding boundaries seriously, then the request needs to be understood 
somewhat differently from current debates.  Indeed, the focus of this debate is doubly 
misguided.  Firstly, if boundaries are ontologically fluid, dynamic, context-dependent, 
and epistemically pragmatic, then there can be no fact of the matter where they are 
drawn. Therefore the request for a MoC needs to be understood independently of 
boundary disputes.   

Secondly, this is crucial if we want to avoid falling into an inner/outer dichotomy trap 
and the individualism thesis.  We thus have to start with the question of what it is that 
makes a system cognitive in the first place.  Arguing that cognitive processes extend this 
or that boundary, not only tacitly preserves this distinction, but also continues to endorse 
the notion that there is an intrinsic boundary which can be uncovered.  To avoid these 
issues, the starting point cannot be: is this cognitive process extended beyond the brain. 
Instead, we need to ask: what makes a system cognitive?  A MoC is then first and 
foremost a way of reexamining, and if necessary challenging, traditional conception of 
cognition. 

Arguably, one cannot specify the location of cognitive processes before establishing 
what a cognitive process is, but this does not imply that in so doing we will discover the 
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!  Rowlands (2008; 2010) is one of the few EMH theorists who has attempted to provide a MoC.  Here I 10
do not address his proposal but simply note that it is in most respects an extended cognitivist MoC, based 
on cognitivists principles. Moreover it is premised on an assumption we have here been putting into 
question, that there are fixed boundaries to the cognitive.  While Rupert (2009; 2010) offers an equally 
cognitivist account but organism bound MoC.
"true boundaries" of the cognitive.  Again, we can only do so if we preserve the dualist 
(inner/outer) dichotomy, presupposing in advance that the cognitive has intrinsic fixed 
boundaries and that we can actually discover them.  But we have already seen that this 
seems unlikely.   

In sum, the demand for a MoC, needs and has to be, considered independently of 
boundary disputes. In so doing, the focus shifts from boundaries, towards considerations 
regarding the nature of cognition itself.  It thus offers a chance to reexamine and 
challenge traditional notions of cognition, presenting a chance to start developing a truly 
non-cognitivist alternative.  Finally, a MoC is required because I believe that 
demarcating the cognitive from the non-cognitive by ascription, is deeply 
unsatisfactory.  This second point will however only be discussed in the next chapters. 

Next, I will use A&A's own proposed MoC, as a means of elaborating these and further 
issues. 

2.2 - The MoC According to A&A 
A&A offer two necessary conditions as their demarcation criterion, for what counts as 
cognition, based on processes that involve the manipulation of representational states 
bearing non-derived contents.  More precisely, these conditions are that, cognitive 
processes (1) involve original content (non-derived) and (2) have a distinctive form of 
processing. (2001, 2008, 2010).  Accordingly, cognition just is neurally-based causal 
processing involving non-derived content.  Now, granted that we need an unprincipled 
way of demarcating the cognitive from the non-cognitive, how adequate is this criteria? 

First point to note is that this account requires (without any argument) that cognition 
must involve a brain or nervous system.  This is a direct consequence of its underlying 
anthropogenic thesis.  From this perspective, the behaviours of "simple" organisms 
which lack a nervous system such as jellyfish and unicellular organisms such as protists 
and bacteria cannot, as a matter of fact, count as cognitive.   In A&A's defence this is the 
default assumption in cognitive science.   But this should only be accepted, if it can be 
shown, beyond any reasonable doubt, that human beings (or organisms with brains) are 
the only genuinely cognitive systems. 
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There is an increasing amount of empirical research, from different fields, including 
micro-biology and comparative behavioural studies, lending support and evidence for 
cognitive abilities already in single-celled organisms (e.g., Ben-Jacob et al. 2006; 
Bitboll & Luigi, 2004; di Primio et al. 2000; Shapiro 2007; Taylor, 2004).  All of these 
are converging on the view that the complexity of the behaviours of some unicellular 
organisms rivals that of organisms equipped with nervous systems or simple brains. 
Recent microbiological evidence shows that bacteria already exhibit complex cognitive-
like capabilities that are often presumed to be precluded to organisms with centralised 
brains (Auletta 2011).  

For example, some of the capacities found in bacteria include: indirect and modifiable 
stimulus-response couplings, robust sensory adaptation, memory, and social co-
operation (Müller, di Primio, & Lengeler, 2001). The idea that prokaryotes are already 
capable of cognitive-like behaviours suggests that cognition represents a 
phylogenetically ancient adaptive process that evolved long before the establishment of 
cephalized nervous systems.  This observation, which is gathering considerable 
empirical support, substantially undermines the brain-centric view of cognition A&A are 
advocating.  Thus, we cannot simply assume,  a priori, that cognition is just what 
human organisms do and then reduce these activities to brains.  Given the increasing 
empirical evidence, we at least need an argument as to why this should be the case.  

These consideration on their own should be sufficient to greatly undermine A&A's, or 
any other brain-based only proposal. More importantly however, what this indicates, is 
that we require a non-anthropogenic MoC.    One way to rescue this criteria would 11
perhaps be to stipulate that it only applies to organisms with a nervous-system or just 
human cognition.  But even so, the criteria still contains other problems. 

Consider the first condition, the non-derived content requirement.  A&A argue that, "a 
first essential condition on the cognitive is that cognitive states must involve intrinsic, 
non-derived content” (2001, p. 48).  The first hurdle for this requirement is the lack of 
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!  This issue is explored further in the next few chapters.11
any consensus on what non-derived content actually is.   But, putting this worry aside, 
the intuition behind the idea of non-derived content (Searle 1983), is that natural 
cognitive systems are distinctive because they possess content (understood as internal 
mental representations) not determined by social convention but intrinsic to the system.  

A stop-sign for example, derives its meaning through social convention, but the mental 
representation of a stop-sign has its meaning intrinsically.  While a stop-sign is a 
publicly accessible object and its meaning is determined by social convention the same 
could not be said about mental content.  For A&A, the content of mental representations 
cannot be conventionally determined. We do not, cannot, take the group of neurones 
which make up a mental state and agree, by social convention, that they have the 
content of a stop-sign.  Furthermore, A&A believe that neural states, and they alone, are 
the conduits for intrinsic non-derived content.   

We have already briefly pointed out how Clark's reply undermines A&A's requirement 
for intrinsic content.  There is a further problem lurking behind this requirement.  This is 
because even cognitive states with non-derived content must have some derived content 
to it.  Consider the thought of a stop-sign and assume it has been produced in sone 
naturalistic way.  Now, it appears that this particular mental state cannot have all its 
content intrinsically, because this state on its own, cannot constitute the concept of a 
stop-sign.  The concept of a stop-sign is derived from the social conventions that 
determine what it is, how it is used what it is used for etc.  What this implies is that, 
although the state of having a concept of a stop-sign might arguably be partially non-
derived, this state by itself cannot tell us what it is a content of.   I cannot know what a 
stop-sign is upon encountering it for the first time.  I might have some internal non-
derived state of some kind, but this state by itself, is not enough to tell me what I am 
actually looking at.  I need to know the context and social practices surroundings the use 
of this sign, and this clearly is not derived, but conventional (Menary 2010a,b,). 

It thus appears that, demanding that cognition exclusively  requires non-derived content, 
is problematic.  Yet, if A&A only require that cognition involves some intrinsic content, 
then this is clearly not a problem for the EMH.  Indeed, these would be more than 
willing to admit that some constituent parts of a cognitive process, will have some 
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intrinsic content.  Nonetheless, A&A can reply by pointing out that external components 
in these processes are merely enablers of the non-derived content and not constitutive of 
it.   This exchange is particularly illuminating, as it clearly demonstrates the 
impossibility of settling the dispute when its played out in terms of boundaries.  Only a 
MoC, not motivated by boundaries, will do. 

What about A&A second requirement, that cognitive processes involves a distinctive 
form of causal processing.  This requirement is directly connected to the first, cognition 
involves computational operations over states of non-derived content which are 
implemented in special kinds of mechanisms (distinctive form of processing).  Thus 
cognitive phenomena differ from non-cognitive phenomena in virtue of the nature of 
these underlying processes (2008, p. 57).  According to A&A, these processes 
(mechanisms) are fundamentally distinctive and we need to examine extended cognitive 
processes to establish whether they too possess this distinctive character.   

We have already seen that this cannot be the whole story, but could it apply to human 
cognition alone?  Most proponents of the EMH have replied by pointing out that A&A 
are merely question-begging.  That is, rather than offering neutral criteria for 
demarcating the cognitive from the non-cognitive, they simply presuppose that 
cognition is exclusively a brain process.  This clearly won't do, since it's exactly this 
conviction which is at stake.  Inline with what I have said thus far, I take this to be a 
point well taken against A&A, which further shows the need to reexamine taken for 
granted assumptions. 

In sum, regardless of the exact plausibility of A&A's proposal, it does however highlight 
the need for a non-anthropogenic, location-neutral, unbiased criteria for demarcating the 
cognitive from the non-cognitive.  We suggested that, by demanding a MoC it makes it 
possible, and indeed a requirement, to promote a shift of focus away from boundaries 
towards the reexamination of the nature of cognition itself.  We need to first account for 
what a cognitive process is, regardless of boundary issues.   

Similarly, and this worry applies particularly to ascriptional demarcating criteria, a MoC 
becomes more pressing because everyone agrees that we are cognitive and that anything 
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sufficiently resembling us, should also be counted as cognitive.  What is not explained is 
what is it ‘for us’, let alone anything else, to be cognitive agents (Di Paolo 2009; 
Thompson 2007),   We can stare at brains, biological bodies and external tools all day 
long, this will tell us nothing about cognitive agency.  

We therefore appear to have some good reasons for demanding a MoC.  The next 
section outlines a distinction which will serve as the basis for our alternative proposal in 
this work. 

3 Embedding & Embodiment Revisited 
To my mind, the EMH and SC more generally, are on the right track when emphasising 
embodiment-embedding in cognition.  Yet, ultra cognitivists like A&A, need not take 
any issue with this. Therefore, we need to understand exactly how cognitive systems are 
embedded and embodied.  To be all but trivial, it will not do to merely point this obvious 
fact out. So, in the next two subsections I will introduce a distinction between what I 
call strong and weak types of embedding & embodiment which will serve as two axis on 
which to plot an alternative MoC.  This will be further articulated in the next two 
chapters. 

3.1 - Weak & Strong Embedding  
Brooks (1999) identifies embedding and embodiment as the two central concepts for a 
new understanding of cognition.   Recall that the embedding thesis argues that cognition 
requires an environment, not only is it shaped by, but also crucially dependent upon, 
externally tools, processes and structures.  Consequently, cognition cannot be effectively 
explained or studied, by examining processes, states, or structures that occur solely 
within the confines of the brain or body. Cognition is situated and unfolds in the context 
of a real-world environment.  

With this in mind, I will argue that there are two very distinct ways that a system can be 
said to be embedded in an environment, not usually recognised in the SC literature (but 
see Sharkey & Ziemke 1998; Ziemke & Sharkey 2001; 2003; Ziemke 2001; 203).   The 
distinction is drawn between what I will call weak and strong embedding.  As a first 
approximation, to be strongly embedded, a system not only needs to be in, but needs to 
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have an environment.  In the sense I use this distinction any physical object extended in 
space can be said to be in an environment.  This corresponds to the coupling (see 
Chapter 2) which obtains between system and environment, whereby a system is 
influenced by and in turn influences back, its environment.   

A thermostat provides a good example of a system embedded in, but which does not 
have an environment.  Such systems partake in (coupled) dyadic system-environment 
relationships and are what I call weakly embedded systems.  However, some systems, 
primarily living, can also be said to have an environment in the sense that, this 
environment which it has, is a place of intrinsic significance. 

I thus distinguish between two modes of embedding for any system.  A system can 
either be weakly embedded, in which case it will be a reactive system that operates by 
external forces through dyadic causal relationships.  Such systems, as we will further 
elaborate in the next chapter, lack the capacity to transform information into meaning. 
By contrast, any system can be said to be strongly embedded if and only if, it can 
transform information into meaning.  I leave it to the next chapter to flesh this out. For 
now I merely introduce the distinction. 

3.2 - Weak & Strong Embodiment 
To understand the distinction between weak/strong embodiment, lets take a closer look 
at how the EMH treats the body.  On the one hand, given the EMH functionalist 
underpinnings, cognitive systems do not strictly speaking need to be embodied, while 
on the other hand, embodiment is understood as a trivial taken for granted notion. 
Recall that functionalism asserts that computations are not tied down to any particular 
substrate.  Although computations need some physical platform to be implemented they 
are independent of the platform. 

Shapiro (2004) has dubbed this the "separability thesis" (ST).  It states that a humanlike 
mind could perfectly well exist in a very non-humanlike body.  Thus, although mind and 
body causally interact, the mind is in some sense autonomous from its morphological 
implementations and can thus be successfully abstracted away from these physical 
details.  This, Shapiro claims, implies "body neutrality" whereby the kind of mind one 
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has, is in no way determined by the characteristics of the body.  The hardware/software 
distinction is thus upheld, but at a price. Since this seems to clearly imply a form of 
dualism, as a mind can now somehow float free from its body (Shapiro 2004; Thompson 
& Stapleton 2009). 

Clark has been very explicit on how one should conceive of the body and in the process, 
committing himself to the ST.  Accordingly, “the body, insofar as it is cognitively 
significant, turns out to be itself defined by a certain complex functional role” (Clark 
2008b, p. 56).  Furthermore, "the body is special. But we should understand its 
specialness through the familiar lens of our best information processing models of mind 
and cognition.”  This notion of "embodiment" nicely integrates within the computational 
framework of cognitivism.  It is in this sense, that the body can equally become a trivial 
taken for granted notion. Though cognitive systems need to have some kind of body, a 
physical implementation, the material bases of this implementation plays no significant 
role as such, any platform will do.   

I call this type of embodiment - weak embodiment. Yes, the body matters, but only as an 
implementation substrate. The actual morphological structure of a particular system, nor 
the deeply integrated biological organisation of living bodies, play any essential role in 
cognitive processing.  I leave it to Chapter 5 to explain strong embodiment.  

Strong embedding-embodiment will be argued to form the basis of genuine cognition 
and constitutes two interconnect halves of a MoC.   

Conclusion 
This chapter argued that boundary disputes are unsolvable  and made a case for a MoC, 
not as a means of settling boundaries disputes, but to avoid dualism and pursue non-
cognitivism.   An initial distinction between strong/weak embedding/embodiment was 









In this chapter we begin our goal of developing a location-neutral, non-species-specific, 
non-cognitivist account of  cognition.  Drawing from the work of Jakob Von Uexküll, 
we sketch a framework on which the notion of strong embedding is based.  We begin by 
proposing a biogenic methodology which is then complemented by Uexküll's work.  We 
then go on to conceptualise the notion of strong embedding as the ability to transform 
information into meaning.  We conclude the chapter by revisiting the EMH. 

1 Of Strong Embedding  
To provide a location-neutral, non-species-specific, non-cognitivist account of 
cognition, we first need to jettison the constraints of the anthropogenic thesis and 
endorse a biogenic stance.  This will then be further developed around a Uexküllian 
framework. 

1.1 - From Anthropogenic To a Biogenic Methodology 
The primary aim of this section is to propose an alternative to the anthropogenic thesis 
which we saw limits the scope of cognition to human capacities. One of the underlying 
assumptions motivating this work, is that before cognitive systems can do the "higher-
level" tasks (abstract reasoning,  logic, planing, etc) found in humans, they first need to 
autonomously and effectively, negotiate their environment.  All living organisms have 
capacities uniquely attuned to their particular environments  enabling them to make a 
living.  Insofar as this is the case, cognition must exist in degrees across the biological 
domain, and cannot be unique to humans. 

This is not to devalue the higher-level capacities humans possess, only that, as we saw 
in the previous chapter, these by themselves cannot set the benchmark for a MoC. 
Notably, it is precisely the anthropogenic focus on high-level human cognitive 
capacities which has led to a systematic neglect and devaluing, of other "lower-order" 
capacities, which are equally important if not more so, for cognition.  In so doing it has 
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implicitly encouraged the assumption that, not only is there an intrinsic fact-of-the-
matter distinction between "basic cognition" and "cognition proper", but also, that one 
can understand cognition without having to pay much attention to these so-called "basic 
forms" of cognition (Auletta 2011; Keijzer 2001). These anthropogenic preconceptions 
need to be rejected for a more biologically inclusive approach to cognition.  

As the etymological origins of the word indicate, bios is the Greek for life and genesis 
meaning birth or origin.  The starting point of a biogenic stance is that it attempts to 
understand cognition, first and foremost, as a natural biological process, in terms of 
biological functions like any other, which primarily contribute to the persistence, 
survival and general wellbeing of organisms.  It recommends that biological principles 
(as appose to abstract functionalist ones) are our best guide into understanding what 
cognition is.  Cognition is thus conceptualised as a natural process, rather than as an 
object (computer)   (Auletta 2011; Goodson 2003; Hoffmeyer 2008; Lyons 2006; Lyons 12
& Keijzer 2007; Maturana & Varela 1980; Moreno et al 1997). 

Because adaptations contributing to the viability and wellbeing of the organism tend to 
be conserved over evolutionary time, it advocates a strong evolutionary continuity 
among organisms of varying complexity.   It recognises that complex life-forms and 
organic processes have evolved from simpler life-forms.  A fairly uncontroversial point, 
but one with consequences that current cognitive science has not always appreciated.   

High-level human activities are very late arrivals in the evolutionary scene.  Indeed, all 
the abilities cognitivists take to be the hallmark of cognition; logic, mathematical 
reasoning, language etc, presuppose more basic system environment relations, which 
enable these late arrivals and, which cannot be separated from this basic core.  Thus, 
rather than seeing simpler organism's actions as cognitively empty, they are best 
understood as a fundamental prerequisite which cannot be ignored.  Moreover, it makes 
good methodological sense to start with simple cases then scale up, rather than as 
cognitivists do, start with the most complex (cf. Brooks 1999). 
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!  Or a Watt-Governor for that matter (cf van Gelder 1995).12
From this perspective, a clear unbiased line cannot be drawn between lower & higher 
levels of cognition, as cognition is on a biological continuum.  This fits our discussion 
on boundaries rather well.  Given the dynamic open nature of living system, which 
incessantly require energy from the environment, transforms it into usable fuel, 
discharge wastes and reproduce; they all also tend to share certain generic functions 
such as ingestion, digestion, circulation, respiration, replication etc.   Thus while the 
heart of a leach for example, is neither homologous nor does it bear any structural 
resemblance to that of a human heart, both nevertheless serve the function of pumping 
blood in order to circulate oxygen and other nutrients and to remove waste. Only a 
commitment to anthropogenic intuitions prevents us from not understanding cognition 
in similar terms.   

Anthropogenic approaches tend to neglect the entire evolutionary line that gives rise to 
"higher-level" cognitive abilities, making it difficult to understand their functional 
origins and how they relate to the whole organism.  As Deacon (2012, p. 26) notes; 
"Minds were not in some way grafted onto biological systems; mentality emerged from 
and grew out of organisms during their evolution".  Importantly, to take evolution 
seriously is to appreciate the historical nature of living organisms as individuals with 
their own contingent history which are not solely govern by deterministic laws (see 
Chapter 6, for further discussion). 

Naturally human cognition itself falls under the purview of a biogenic stance and  needs 
to be accounted for, but it does not itself set the benchmark for the cognitive.  As such; 
"There is no assumption that human cognition is the "most developed" or "perfect" form 
of biological function, however extraordinary and complex it may be" (Lyons & Keijzer 
2007, p. 141), as cognitivists tend to assume.  If cognition evolved, as most would 
agree, then it is first and foremost a manner of basic living in the world. 

Cognition, in all its forms, needs to be understood as grounded in biological principles 
of environmentally embedded organisms, which are geared towards viability.  While the 
EMH starts from the "top", focusing on complex human cognitive skills, the biogenic 
approach starts from the "bottom", starting from biological facts which apply across the 
board, then works up to the more complex human cases.  Thus the anthropogenic/
 51
biogenic distinction is a methodological criteria for the study of cognition.  It suggests a 
different starting point, that of natural biological organisms generally, rather than 
selective human capacities.  As Lyons & Keijzer (ibid) point out; 

...an investigator adopting an anthropogenic approach to cognition starts with the human 
case in the believe that the features of human cognition are the most plausible and 
potentially most fruitful (probably the only) guide to understanding the phenomena of 
cognition generally.  By contrast, an investigator  adopting a biological approach assumes 
that the principles of biological organisation present the most productive route to a general 
understanding of cognition because natural cognition is a biological process (ibid, pp. 
138-139). 

The biogenic approach is then a methodological principle for cognitive science, a 
starting point rather than a prescription on how to study cognition or what cognition is 
as such.  It provides a foundation for developing an ontology of cognition. 

In sum, cognition is not best conceived as an abstract disembodied phenomena modelled 
on selective human abilities.  From the biogenic perspective, cognition is best 
understood in the general context of biological organisation/functioning.  The starting 
point should be that of living organisms, from simple to complex. This allows for a 
much more inclusive, less chauvinistic, approach to cognition.  Note however that an 
anthropogenic approach can itself be biological or include biological facts. For example 
facts from evolution or neuroscience but these do not provide the foundation for the 
ontology of cognition itself. These merely offer secondary constrains to be satisfied by 
an account grounded in human cognition (cf. Millikan 1984). 

There is however a potential problem here.  A common understanding of teleology 
(which for now assume is necessary for meaning and cognition) in biological sciences, 
is that purposiveness in organisms is simply an ascription of an observer.  Intentionality, 
goal-directedness, meaning and value, is viewed as an illusion.  Animal actions are 
teleonomic, the explanation of biological facts as the statistical results of natural 
selection which post factum gives the appearance of goal-direct behaviour (Dawkins, 
1987). From this perspective, a teleological explanation can always be substituted by a 
(teleonomic) factual ‘as-if' description (Deacon 2012; Nagel, 1977; Weber & Varela, 
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2002).  To counter this sort of skepticism, we will in the next section draw from the 
work of Uexküll. 

1.2 - The Emergent Umwelt 
To elaborate on the tenets of the previous section I will draw on the work of theoretical 
biologist/ethologist Jakob von Uexküll.  This will provide an alternative framework to 
help loosen the clutches of cognitivism.   

I draw from Uexküll's work because it is biogenic, rejects anthropomorphism/
anthropogenic intuitions and endorses a view of organisms not as passive machine but 
as agent actively constructing a world.  Moreover, agency is deeply biological and 
understood in relational interactional terms, rejecting the dualistic notion that subjects 
and objects are two distinct entities.   And, it does so in true SC style, by emphasising 
the importance of embodiment and embedding. 

A central concern for Uexküll was to introduce the notion of "agency" into biology, 
particularly in relation to meaning (Rüting 2004). Uexküll was very critical of the 
"mechanistic biology" of his day, which regarded organisms as machines, or as sensory 
and motor organs simply "stitched  together".  By contrast, Uexküll regarded organisms 
as more than the sum of their parts and argued that organisms are; "subjects whose 
essential activity consists of perceiving and acting" (Uexküll 1957. p, 6). Accordingly, 
biology should study organisms not as objects, but as active subjects.   13

To illustrate how organisms, as agents, meaningfully act in their environments,  Uexküll 
introduced the concept of an Umwelt around which he constructed his theory of 
meaning.  This concept originated from Uexküll's close study of the relationship 
between organisms and their environments and recognising that each organism 
perceives and "constructs" its own unique individual subjective/phenomenal world.  For 
Uexküll the perceived world of any organism emerges through the connection of what 
he called "receptor and effector cues".  Giving rise to what we now might term, self-
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!  Throughout this and the following chapters I will use the terms "agent" and "subject" interchangeably 13
assuming that they are roughly equivalent.  We can provisionally understand an "agent" as any system 
which is goal directed (see Chapter 6). Here I prefer agent, as it seems to me to carry less anthropogenic 
baggage, and more easily applicable to other systems. 
organising sensory and motor processes, coalescing into sensorimotor loops.     It is on 14
the basis of deep dynamic action-perception integration, that organisms transform 
physical environments into worlds of meaning. 

To appreciate the notion of an Umwelt, it will be helpful to contrast it with two other 
related, but distinct concepts (Emmeche 2001).  These being the concept of a habitat 
and that of a niche.  Very roughly, the habitat of an organism are those aspects of an 
organism's environment that are "objectively" specified by an external observer.  While 
the niche of the organism, refers to its ecological functions within the ecosystem 
(Odling-Smee 2003).    Thus, although related, they are evidently distinct.  The concept 
of an Umwelt highlights that, not only do organisms actively contribute to the 
construction of its own world, but also that the world is infused with unique meaning 
and signification for the organism, characteristics not recognised by the other concepts. 

An Umwelt then, is "the self-centred world of the organism - the world in which an 
organism lives, the one that it recognises and makes" (Kull 2010, p. 43). More 
specifically, it refers to the phenomenal side of the organism, the world around an 
organism as it is perceived and subjectively experienced by the organism, those aspects 
of its world which have unique salient for it.  A unique world the organism actively 
creates. These phenomenally salient aspects are a result of the organism's species-
specific sense-organs, its morphological structural organisation its biological needs, 
currant state and its ongoing worldly activities.   

Uexküll presents a picture of organisms, not as discrete predefined static bounded units, 
but as contingently ongoing, dynamically unfolding, interactive, relational active 
processes. Uexküll places much emphasis on the intertwined reciprocal nature of this 
relationship.  Organisms and environment form single integrated coupled systems of 
mutual specification and as such, subject and object cannot be viewed as two separate 
entities as they are mutually, though asymmetrically, interdependent (see Chapter 6). 
The traditional inside/outside dichotomy prominent in the EMH, simply falls away here, 
an organism is nothing without its Umwelt, and an Umwelt does not exist without an 
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!  Although, as we will soon see, these are somewhat different from sensorimotor loops.14
organism.  The Umwelt is therefore a thoroughly relational process; it is nor something 
in the organism nor outside independent of it.  It is not something which can exist 
independently of the organism but nor is it strictly inside the organism, it is precisely 
that which emerges in the middle so to speak.    

1.2.1 - Functional Cycles 
This inextricableness between organism and environment finds expression in Uexküll's 
concept of "functional cycles", which serves as the mechanism for Umwelt-construction. 
These are the abstract structures that tie together the organisms's subjective experience, 
its perception (the perceptual cue) and the manifested behaviour of the agent (the 
effector cue). This led Uexküll (2010) to infer that different species of organisms, would 
engage in various functional relationships with the same environment, yet experience it 
in different ways.  Organisms could have the same environment but different Umwelt. 
Uexküll takes the observation that organisms respond only to very specific information 
while selectively ignoring other, as evidence for this conclusion.  Accordingly, 
organisms equipped with their species-specific sense-organs have different functional 
cycles which enables them to selectively respond to relevant information cues which 
will lead to unique species-relative constructed worlds.  

For Uexküll, purposeful goal-directed behaviour, can only be adequately explained by 
uniting the organism's subjective "perceptual world" and its "effector" enacted world, 
into a single closed whole.   

We can no longer regard animals as mere machines, but as subjects whose essential activity 
consists in perceiving and acting.... All that a subject perceives becomes his perceptual 
world and all that he does, his effector world. Perceptual and effector worlds together form 
a closed unit, the Umwelt (ibid, 6) 

Here agency acts as an integrative mechanism for agent-environment coherence, the 
organism's subjective nature integrates its components into a purposeful goal-directed 
whole. This is in sharp contrast to the purely mechanistic doctrine that all living beings 
are "mere machines". 
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The notion of circularity is crucial here as it links perception to action and turns a closed 
sensorimotor loop, into a continuous meaningful process of interaction.  Every 
perception requires a readiness to act, an ability to choose some phenomena which had 
been neutral up to that point, while every actions in turn requires perception. Without 
perception there is no action and without action no perception.  In this manner organism 
and environment co-evolve in mutual specifying circular processes of dynamic 
feedback.  The organism acts in the environment and the environment feeds-back into 
the organism, in the process transforming this environment into an Umwelt.    The 
notion of the co-evolution of organism and environment, is fundamental for our 
understanding of cognition, and presents further support for overcoming the 
individualism of the inner/outer dichotomy. 

Unlike a sensorimotor loop however, which can be examined in isolation from the 
behaviour of the organism as a whole, a functional cycle can only be examined in 
context with the behaviour of the embodied organism.  The sensorimotor loop involved 
in moving away from a light source for example, cannot be described as a functional 
cycle by itself (Macinnes & Di Paolo 2006). This is because, only when we place the 
sensorimotor process in context, with the light, and hence the perceptual cue, 
diminishing as the organism moves away, can we describe this behaviour as a functional 
cycle.  Importantly, the perceptual cue cannot be said to exist in any particular location 
within the parts the organism. Their existence can only be inferred because we are 
assuming the existence of functional cycles (Almeida e Costa et al. 2008; Macinnes  & 
Di Paolo 2005). 

This point has an important consequence, it seems to suggest that embodied 
sensorimotor activity which recursively interlocks action and perception, so that action 
provides guidance for perception and perception guides action, cannot be considered the 
sole source of meaning and cognition.  Effector and receptor tools (action and 
perception) alone, as Uexküll claimed, are insufficient to make up motivated meaningful 




We can see this by considering the relation between organism and relevant 
informational "stimuli" again.  Do organisms merely passively react to external forces as 
cogs in machines?  For Uexküll this is self-evidently no, and this can be seen by looking 
at organismic embodiment.  In order to understand why animals are morphologically/
structurally organised in the way they are, and thus why they act on and perfectly fit into 
the world as they do, Uexküll insists that: "meaning is the guiding star that biology must 
follow".   But what does this almost mystical remark mean?   

The intuition here, as we have already seen, is that organisms are agents not passive 
entities at the mercy of external forces, out of vital necessity, they need to be active 
creators of their own Umwelt.  Only in so doing can they become an integral part of 
Nature's grand design.  Appreciating this point should help appreciate that there is more 
to cognition than mere sensorimotor coupling. (This will be further discussed in the next 
chapters.) 

Consider Uexküll's (2010) example of a flower in a blooming meadow, which comes to 
find itself in the Umwelt of a little girl, an ant, a cicada larva and a cow. Depending on 
the Umwelt stage in which it appears, the flower stem plays the role of ornament for the 
little girl, a path for the ant, liquid extraction point for cicada-larva (which will use it to 
build its house) and food for the cow.  Each component of the flower stem-object 
comes into contact with a matching "complement" of the agents body which becomes 
the "meaning-utiliser". Thus the Umwelt, due in great part to the morphology of the 
agent, becomes its personal system of meaning, 

Consequently, there can be no neutral objects for living organisms. Meanings are 
"imprinted" by agents upon otherwise meaningless objects.  Objects without any role in 
relation to a particular Umwelt simply do not exist for the organism involved. 
Furthermore, in different Umwelten the same object may constitute a different reality 
and thus have, what Uexküll called different "functional tones".     A chair for a human 15
is something to sit on while for a dog its something to lie under.  
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!  These are very similar to what Gibson (1979) called "affordances", only, they are not invariant 15
objective properties of the world, but emerge in context and are relative to the organism.
As we saw, there is a continuous reciprocal relation between world-experience and 
organism. The organs of the ant are in tune with the demands and tasks within its 
Umwelt, while at the same time its Umwelt is created through the capacities and 
actualities of its sense-organs. Morphology, interests, needs and capacities give rise to a 
certain Umwelt, and the Umwelt  refers to and demands certain capacities and interests.  

Consider the female tic: A female tick's skin is sensitive to light and this guides her up 
from the ground to a brighter position on a branch or blade of grass.  Once up, she will 
hang there until butyric acid emanating from a mammal reaches her.  Upon sensing the 
butyric acid, she will drop and plunge straight into the mammal.  Here the perceptual 
cue of butyric acid  triggers an effector cue which results in the release of the tick's legs 
and enables it to drop onto the mammal.  When the tactile cue of hitting the mammal's 
coat is triggered, she begins to move around, searching for warmth, upon encountering 
the skin she will trigger a burrowing behaviour, after which she starts to burrow in and 
suck the warm nourishing blood. When she has finished her first and last meal, she will 
drop down, lay her eggs on the earth, and die.   

As Uexküll points out, practically everything in the world which engulfs the tick, has 
absolutely no salient value or meaning for it.  The stars, weather, noises, smells, leaves, 
shadows, and so on, do not matter to her. Certainly they will belong to the Umwelten of 
other organisms  living  amidst the tick, but they do not "carry" any meaning for our 
female tick.  None of these are salient or convey any meaningful information for the tic 
itself, its Umwelt consists merely of three information bearing cues, which are of 
intrinsically significance.  This theory of meaning then, helps Uexküll explain all animal 
behaviour, the behavioural unity of organisms and their environmental embedding, in a 
non-anthropomorphic biologically grounded manner 

The above examples suggest that organisms can autonomously decide which 
information to react to, so a stimulus does not necessarily lead to the formation of a 
functional cycle.  This means that to some extent organisms can choose what will serve 
as a perceptual cue under different contextual conditions or different internal states and 
so choose what they will experience. Thus, when the tick was on the branch, the smell 
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of butyric acid acted as a perceptual cue, but when the tick was in the fur, this was no 
longer the case.   

This clearly suggests that, information is situated and context-dependent, even for a tic. 
A topic to which we now turn. 

2 Strong Embedding as the Transformation of Information Into Meaning 
Uexküll's work was introduced as a framework for explaining the notion of strong 
embedding, which can provisionally be conceptualised as the capacity for transforming 
information into meaning through functional cycles.  However, given the multiple 
meanings the concepts of information and meaning have, we will have to refine them in 
light of our current discussion.  

2.1 - Information and Meaning 
From the perspective of information theory developed by Wiener & Shannon, 
information was defined in terms of the probability of transmission of a digital string of 
symbols through a channel (Shannon 1948).  Understood this way, information could be 
mathematically defined, measured and stored, this implied that it was context 
independent, universal and devoid of meaning.   However, not everyone agreed with this 
view. Bateson (1979) for example, wanted to get meaning back into information.  These 
theorists argued that, context should be taken into account, and that information needs to 
be treated as something situated. Because situatedness implied that universalisation and 
quantification becomes practically impossible, information lost its meaning and 
Shannon's information theory won the day (cf. Deacon 2007; 2008). 

Information thus lost its "body", and its meaning too.  In the process a distinction 
between matter and form was introduced which is structurally similar to mind-body 
dualism (Brier 2010; Hayles 1999; Oyama 2000; Thompson 2007).  This is obviously 
problematic for the sort of view we are attempting to develop.   Therefore, in the context 
of the Uexküllian framework, the concept of meaning will be argued to be more relevant 
than the concept of information (as traditionally understood), when it comes to 
understanding bio-systems.  To help us put meaning back into information, it will be 
useful to firstly revive its original understanding, which had to do with form, "to inform" 
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means "to put form into" something or other.  This original notion of information will 
guide subsequent understanding.   16

With these preliminaries in mind, our point of departure will be the idea that cognitive 
systems do not traffic in abstract form-independent information, but in meaning.  Thus, 
information has to be understood in relation to meaning not in terms of standard 
information theory, which reduces communication to a dyadic covariance (cause-and-
effect) process of ‘signal and response', a transfer of information between sender and 
receiver (Bates, 2006; Dretske 1981; Skyrms 2010).  Nor about logical truth conditions, 
i.e. what the world would have to be like for a sentence to be “true”, nor about mapping 
from a logical formula to some constructed world, model, or other formal object. 
Rather, to understand information and its relation to meaning, we will follow Bateson 
(1972, p. 315), who characterises the most basic "unit" of information as a "difference 
that makes a difference".  For, implicit in this definition, is the idea that it is the meaning 
of the information which makes the difference.  

Because the notion of meaning will be developed in the Chapter 6, it will suffice here to 
understand it as coextensive with the concept of an Umwelt.  In the sense that, as with 
the Umwelt, meaning is also a relational concept and that all living systems constitute 
their identity whilst  constructing meaning by continuously responding to the 
environment in accordance with their unique boundary structure.  Thus, meaning is 
fundamentally an active dynamic process, the result of the system's functional cycles. 
Importantly, and this is partly why we used the work of Uexküll, meaning is not only a 
mode of human symbolic thought, restricted to conceptual/propositional knowledge.  

It is through functional cycles that organisms transform information into meaning. 
To see more precisely what I mean by this, consider Kant's statement, that "in a piece of 
chalk there are an infinite number of potential facts", used by Bateson (1972) to 
illustrate the idea that a potential fact only becomes an actual fact, when this is 
perceived as relevant to a system.  It is in this way that a difference comes to make a 
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!   The aim here is not to provide a "theory" of information, but simply to provide a different means of 16
approaching the concept, one congenial to our general approach in this work, and further refined in 
Chapter 6.
difference and information becomes meaning.  Bateson's conceptualisation of 
information implies that information does not exist in isolation, but only in relation to a 
particular organism.  There needs to be some system for whom information can make a 
difference, a system capable of transforming information into meaning.  Information 
then, contrary to Shannon and cognitivism, cannot be a disembodied invariant.  

Information is embodied or informed, context-dependent and agent-relative even for the 
most simple of living organisms.  As Oyama (2000, p.147) notes, information; "grows 
out of kinds of relations".  Indeed, from the work of Uexküll we learn how a given 
environmental feature carries or generates different information for different organisms 
and even for the same organism in different states and at different times.   When a bird 
bursts into song, the sounds that reach our ears inform us that there must be a bird 
nearby, but for a moth, no information is generated. And if you were an expert on 
birdsong, you might identify it as a certain species of bird, while a child would simply 
call it ‘bird'.  Therefore, from the same sound, different information is produced.   

As the example demonstrates, information depends on the interplay between context, 
history and the current state of the organism - an agent - for whom it is meaningful 
information.  This suggests two important points; (1) information and meaning are not 
two different things and (2), information is information only for an agent that finds it 
meaningful. There is no information independent of an agent. 

Anticipating the work of Chapter 6, what these two points together suggest, is that 
organisms are interpretive agents, not just passive receivers of signals, nor the sort of 
systems which picks-up observer-independent information.  Indeed, with regards to 
living organisms, this is simply a cognitivist fiction.  Ultimately, interpretation implies 
the ability to transform, or recognise, signals (information) into signs by giving meaning 
to them.  This presents us with the three basic elements of semiosis: object, interpreter 
and sign (Uexküll 1992).  For now it is sufficient to note that, from the Uexküllian 




In sum, the ability to find the world intrinsically meaningful, vis-à-vis transforming 
information into meaning, is what I call strong embedding.  A biological ability not 
exclusively human nor symbolic or linguistic in scope.  Through dynamic functional 
cycles, the system's actions alter its Umwelt as it experiences it.  While in turn, these 
alterations modulate the system's behaviour and the development of its functional 
cycles, which go on to alter the Umwelt in a continuously dynamic and ongoing way. 
The system's distinctive sensorimotor capacities enable it to act and this action alters 
and transforms the types of information available for the organism to use.   

Finally, "transforming information" should not be confused with "picking up" or 
"extracting"  information, as if it is already present "out there" before the appearance of 
any organism. Transforming information into meaning should be understood as a 
formative process rather than a formal one.  Although information is transformed into 
meaning, it is not something done "in the head".  We can say that it requires a "basic 
mind" but it is not in the mind.  That is, information, although dependent on an agent, is 
not dependent on a "mind" (in the sense of a fully fledged proposition-using conscious 
human mind) as such. Exactly how such systems become capable of such feats will be 
explored in the following two chapters. 

2.2 - The EMH and Strong/Weak Embedding 
Armed with these preliminaries on information and meaning I now want to further 
illustrate the distinction between strong/weak embedding by connecting it to the EMH. 
I want to show that extended cognitive systems (ECS), as defended by the EMH, fall 
under the class of weakly embedded systems.  Certainly ECS's are embedded in and 
tightly coupled with, their environment, but, they do not have a world.   Moreover, from 
our discussion on the EMH, it appears that it does not have the theoretical resources to 
account for strong embedding either  Recall that C&C argued for ECS's by pointing to 
how an agent forms a "coupled system" with selective external resources.  But is this 
coupling sufficient to regard ECS as strongly embedded?    

At first glance the EMH might appear deceptively similar to the view presented above. 
But I think it is not and this can be demonstrated by noting that the EMH has no place 
for the agent.  As such, the cognitive "agent" in the EMH is merely a reactive "machine" 
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that does not seem to deserve the status of agent.  Organism-environment coupling, as 
advocated by the EMH, is dyadic and reductive. This is because, the agent is not 
adequately addressed in these relations.  The EMH theorists are certainly correct to draw 
our attention to  the way various external recourses can be included as components in a 
cognitive task.  However, they do so by virtue of the meaning and significance these 
have for us as agents, in the particular cultural embedding we find ourselves in.   

Agency, as Uexküll saw, serves to integrated the various components of the system into 
a purposefully goal-directed whole, without out agency, there is only a mechanical 
closed sensorimotor loop.   Performing a mathematical problem with pen and paper aids 
my task of calculation,  but, it does so by virtue of the meaning this particular task has 
for me and the various cultural possibilities that it affords me.  Were this not the case, 
this task would not get off the ground.   

Essentially, the dyadic nature of dynamical, embodied, situated and extended 
sensorimotor loops, is not enough to turn raw "information" into meaning.  Although 
sensorimotor motor integration is crucial and necessary, it is by itself, not sufficient to 
generate meaning (Jonas 2001; Froese & Ziemke 2009).  An agent, rather than mere 
organism or machine, is also required.  The difference here can be subtle but nonetheless 
very important. 

Thus imagine a jigsaw building robot - Jigro - that builds jigsaws by relying not only on 
internal computational resources, but also by using its morphology and the ability to 
physically manipulate the pieces.  Now, regardless of its computational architecture and 
its physical morphology, Jigro merely responds/reacts mechanically to fixed 
(meaningless) features of the environment and not to context or anything which has any 
significance for him.  He is thus not capable of transforming information into meaning. 
There is no information for Jigro, he is simply pushed around by physical forces.   

By contrast, if you did the puzzle, it would have inherent meaning for you.  Unlike 
Jigro, environmental features do not just affect you in a brute causal manner, as mere 
"raw" information impinging on your sense organs.  Rather, because you can transform 
information into meaning,  they do so by virtue of the meaning and significance they 
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intrinsically have for you.   An ECS is in exactly the same situation as Jigro, so, clearly 
something remains missing from the EMH.  This also highlight the difficulty with 
ascriptional demarcation criteria of cognition, there is more to cognition then mere 
functional organisation or surface behaviour. 

Although Uexküll provided a framework where agency takes centre stage, it remains 
crucially underdeveloped and open to scepticism.  Someone might insist that this is all 
ascriptional and not intrinsic to the systems itself.    Simple organism like tics are 17
merely mechanical automata not agents.  It is not entirely clear that Uexküll has the 
theoretical resources to deal with these issues.  The question now is; can we further 
ground this basic account of agency on principles which can deal with these worries?  A 
response lies in the complimentary notion of strong embodiment.  This we explore in 
the next chapter. 

Conclusion  
As a means of developing an alternative non-cognitivist MoC we drew on several 
sources to developed the distinction between strong/weak embedding.  We presented the 














!  Brier (2008b, p. 30) argues that Uexküll's "framework is behavioural and functionalist like 17
cybernetics".  Although I think this is a mistake I read this as a prompt to strength this Uexküllian 
framework.
Chapter Five 
Strong Embodiment  

Introduction  
In the previous chapter we argued that the essence of strong embedding lies in the 
ability agents have for finding the world inherently meaningful.  The question now is; 
what does it take to be such an agent?  The answer presented here is strong embodiment, 
understood in terms of autonomy based on autopiesis and recursive self-maintenance. 
This will serve to enrich our initial account of agency and avoid the worries flagged at 
the end of the previous chapter.  

1 Of Strong Embodiment 
Here an account of autonomy will be developed which is argued to be the basis of 
strong embodiment.  The class of system identified as strongly embedded, are only so as 
a consequence of being strongly embodied.  Essentially, the one implies and entails the 
other. 

1.1 - Autopoisies 
Cognition requires embodiment but embodiment of a kind which can account for the 
deeply integrated nature of organisms envisioned by Uexküll; for how an organism's 
subjective nature can integrate its components into a purposeful goal-directed whole. 
We thus need an account which can ground, not only the notion of agency introduced in 
the previous chapter, but the idea that this agency acts as an integrative mechanism for 
agent-environment coherence and enables the transforming of information into meaning. 
The answer offered here is autonomy (Bickhard 2004; 2009; Collier, 2002; Christensen, 
2000; Christensen & Bickhard 2002; Di Paolo, 2003; Emmeche, 2004; Hooker 2009; 
Rosen 1991; Thompson, 2007; Varela, 1997; Ziemke 2007; Ziemke & Sharkey, 2001).   

The concept of autonomy has a long and varied history.  In ancient Greece it was mostly 
applied to city-states and related to the political right for self-governance.  In modem 
philosophy, the concept is used mostly in relation to the self-determination  of persons 
with regards to political and ethical matters. In cognitive science, particularly robotics, 
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the term is mostly used in connection with embodiment-embedding and the ability of 
machines to achieve certain tasks with minimal human intervention (Froese et al. 2007) 
The notion of autonomy of interest  here is a biologically inspired one, grounded on 
autopiesis and recursive self-maintenance (Bickhard 2008; Kauffman 2000; Moreno et 
al. 2008; Varela 1997).  

This autonomy however, does not mean systems are isolated or independent from the 
environment, but rather, that they can act on their own behalf and thereby can self-
define and construct its own identity according to its own laws (Kauffman & Clayton 
2006). It is this particular idea of autonomy which we will align with embodiment and 
grounds what I term strong embodiment (cf. Ziemke 2007).  We can thus identify two 
essential properties of strongly embodied/autonomous systems, self-production and self-
governance.  By contrast, heteronomous systems, are a class of system that are other-
governed or, governed from the outside, subject to external control.  We begin with 
autopiesis. 

Continuing in the same theoretical tradition as Uexküll, the theoretical biologists 
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1980; 1989) regard the essential difference 
between living organisms and machines as primarily one of autonomous self-
construction.  Maturana & Varela's starting point is a question concerning the type of 
organisation necessary for life itself.  To answer this question, they introduced the 
concept of autopoiesis (from the Greek for self-producing) which highlights the self-
producing dynamics of living systems and makes autonomy essential to life.   Like 
Uexküll, for Maturana & Varela, living is an active process of deeply integrated 
autonomous organisms, not any of their parts.  

Autonomous agency is defined in terms of a self-producing network of processes which 
constitute its own identity.  Autopoiesis, is then an abstract formalisation of a special 
class of CAS;   a self-creating system.  More precisely, autopietic systems are specified 18
as self-maintaining/self-producing networks of relations, whereby the activity of the 
system consists in a continuous and recursive re-generation/construction of the 
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!  Complex adaptive system.18
processes and components, including a boundary, which together constitute the system 
as an integrated distinct unit, in the face of internal and external perturbations (Luisi 
2006; Lyons 2004; Maturana & Varela 1980; Varela 1997; Thompson 2007).  Varela 
(1997) defines an autopoietic system as follows; 

An autopoietic system is organised (defined as a unity) as a network of processes of 
production (synthesis and destruction) of components such that these components (i) 
continuously regenerate and realize the network that produces them, and (ii) constitute the 
system as a distinguishable unity in the domain they exist (p. 75)  

Living cells and organisms are prime examples of autopoietic systems.  These possess 
the properties of self-maintenance by virtue of actively maintaining its own integral 
organisation and self-production by virtue of actively producing its own components. 
Furthermore, the network of processes is enclosed in a self-constructed semipermeable 
membrane individuating it from its surrounding medium.    Such systems are 
operationally closed, meaning that every constituent process of the system is 
conditioned by and dependent upon, some other process in the system.   In order for a 
process to be included as a part of the system, it must enable and be enabled by, at least 
one other process of that system in a circular causal fashion.   

Autopoiesis thus attempts to provide a theoretically fruitful and scientifically plausible, 
account of the biological organisation which grounds the origin of life and the 
autonomy of living systems.  Like Uexküll, it aims to provide an wholistic framework 
for understanding organisms not merely as a set of disparate mechanistic components 
thrown together, but as fully integrated units which are agents in their own right. 
Moreover, it also seems to provide the potential foundation for explaining how this type 
of biological autonomy, grounds the emergence of an organism's natural Umwelt. 
Autopiesis, it is argued, can help us understand from the inside, the purposeful nature of 
the living.   

Now, although autopoiesis is a good starting point for a theory of autonomy, and 
necessary for autonomous agency,  it is in some respects inadequate for our purpose, 
particularly to ground strong embodiment.  As noted above, the theory provides an 
abstract formalism of an autonomous network, as such, these networks are not 
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considered in terms of material structures as such. Rather, they are conceived 
exclusively as functional networks.  To put it slightly differently, the theory tended to 
mostly focus on form rather than structure or matter (Collier 2002; Froese & Steward 
2010).  As a consequence, living, as a biological process, was conceived in mostly 
abstract terms and overlooked, what Di Paolo (2009) calls, its intrinsically "precarious 
nature". 

Because autopiesis is an all-or-nothing class category, it leaves no conceptual room for 
explaining gradation of concern and interest by the living and is thus incapable of 
grounding Uexküll account of agency and meaning or embodiment.  Essentially, given 
its abstract nature, the concrete thermodynamical requirements of the system have been 
neglected (Barandiaran 2004; Capra 1997; Christensen & Bickhard 2002; Christensen & 
Hooker 2002; Collier 2002; Froese & Steward 2010; Kauffman 2000; 2003; 
Barandairan & Moreno 2008).   

Therefore, as well as the formal organisational self-producing/self-sustaining properties 
(the operational/constructive closure), we also need to take into account the energetic 
thermodynamic (structural/material) requirements of CAS.  We need to account for the 
neglected thermodynamic requirements, the essential materiality and hence the strong 
embodiment, of living systems.  Self-organising dissipative systems, which are types of 
CAS, offer a good complementary account. 

1.2 - Types of Order; Crystals & Candle-flames  
The universe is awash with organised and disorganised material processes of various 
kinds.  A cursory look at these material processes reveal that they come in various forms 
and degrees.  Some, such as crystals and rocks, display a high level of cohesive order. 
Intensive force from outside is needed to disrupt this structural cohesion.  At the other 
extreme,  other processes exhibit no cohesive order whatsoever, as with gases.  So 
cohesion can be understood as that property which endows different types of systems 
with a distinctive type of unity, providing varying degrees of stability in the face of 
internal and external perturbations (Campbell 2010; Collier 1988, 1999).  
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Orderly systems can be divided into two broad classes relative to their cohesion.  The 
first class are characterised by their strong cohesion and constitute conservative 
(energetically speaking) static structure.  These structures have strong internal cohesive 
bonds which are not easily disrupted.  The cohesive bonds produces the system's global 
integrity and thereby individuate it from its environment.  They are a product of the 
intrinsic nature of a set of components interacting under certain specific internal/
external conditions.  Due to the energetically conservative nature of these processes, 
once created, they will exist indefinitely.  Common examples of these types of structures 
are rocks and crystals.   

A second class of system - CAS - exhibit weaker internal cohesion and its components 
are organised in such a manner as to form "dissipative structures" (Prigogine & 
Stenghers 1984).  These system are complex, dynamically open and far from-
thermodynamic-equilibrium.  Here order, referred to as dissipative order, forms into 
dissipative structures and is rather different from the first class. The term dissipative 
structure was introduced by Prigogine (1977; 1996) to characterise a certain kind of 
emergent order/organisation comprised by a set of nonlinear interacting elements which 
generate a cohesive dynamic pattern in far-from-equilibrium conditions and which 
ceases to exist if these conditions are not maintained.  

For Prigogine, dissipative structures are types of far-from-equilibrium self-organising 
systems that are "open" to sources of energy-matter which it uses then expels (dissipate) 
in the form of waste products, back into the environment. Recall that self-organisation 
refers to a system's transition from a disordered into an orderly state, through the 
interaction of local components, in the absence of external or centralised control. 
Through processes of self-organisation global emergent structure/patters appear without 
the need of explicit dictation from outside the system.  Constraints on form and structure 
are internal to the system and result solely from the interactions between its 
subcomponents. These patterns of self-organised emergent order may be found in very 
different processes and  across different levels of spatiotemporal scale  (Camazine et al. 
2000).  Prigogine's insight was that when such self-organising open systems get into 




To produce these sorts of structures a system must exhibit some nonlinear properties and 
possess some positive or negative feedback mechanisms.   It also requires a constant 
steady flow of matter-energy to maintain it far-from-equilibrium and stable.   A common 
example is the Rayleigh-Bernard convection cells, where regular patterns of convection 
cells form on the surface of a fluid maintained under appropriate heat differential 
between its bottom and its open surface (Strogatz, 1994). Here the maintenance of the 
heat differential is dependent on an external source of energy (the boundary conditions), 
a fire.  Though the system can maintain a certain degree of stability, it is however 
completely at the mercy of the boundary conditions that help maintain it, which if 
altered, leads to its collapse.  

Some dissipative systems however, are also capable of regenerating some of the 
conditions for the process to occur, these are called "self-maintaining 
systems" (Bickhard 2009; Christensen & Hooker 2002). The property of self-
maintenance refers to a particular causal regime, whereby a system is capable of 
exerting a causal influence on some of the boundary conditions which enable its own 
persistence. A candle flame is a good example of such a system.  It can maintain above 
combustion threshold temperatures, in a standard gravitational field and atmosphere, it 
induces convections which draw in oxygen and eliminates combustion products and it 
vaporises wax into useable fuel. (Bickhard 2009; Barandiaran & Moreno 2008; Collier 
1999; Hooker 2011). These systems are ubiquitous in nature and range from burning 
candles to living organisms. 

All self-maintaining systems possess a type of organisation which enables then to 
persist and maintain a constant stable state at a distance from thermodynamic 
equilibrium despite ongoing and irreversible processes of construction and degeneration. 
The far-from-equilibrium conditions are kept stable, by virtue of the establishment of 
certain internal organisational dynamics and certain external boundary conditions, 
They are capable, unlike the Rayleigh-Bernard convections, of contributing to their own 
self-maintenance.   For these reasons, self-organising self-maintaining far-from-
equilibrium dissipative systems, present us with a bridge between the abstract form of 
autopiesis and the essential materiality of concrete physical structures. 
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However, all CAS are self-maintaining dissipative structures (Kauffman 2011), does this 
imply there is no difference between organisms and a candle flames?   As Hutto (2010, 
p. 45) recently puts it; "what is that makes self-organising sophisticated biological 
organisms importantly unlike other kinds of purely physical systems".    Since living 
systems are instances of CAS, what is it that does make them different, if not in kind 
then at least in degree, from other systems in this broader class (Capra 1997)?  Linking 
autopiesis with self-maintenance provides an answer. 

1.3 - Dissipative Structures to Autonomous Systems 
As Schrödinger (1944) famously noted, all living systems exist in states far-from-
thermodynamic-equilibrium, and it is thus puzzling that they can retain stability for 
periods of time without disintegrating through entropy (second law of thermodynamics). 
Indeed, most dissipative structures eventually succumb to this particular fate.  Recall 
that according to the second law of thermodynamics, energy and material in an isolated 
closed system, will become randomly distributed over time and eventually reach a state 
of equilibrium (Mitchell 2009).  That is, entropy will steadily increase and lead the 
system to lose all its ability to do work.  Schrödinger's own insightful suggestion to the 
puzzle, anticipating Prigogine by some decades, was to point to systemic organisation. 

Schrödinger noted that, while it seems that living systems disobey the second law, this is 
not in actual fact accurate.  Rather, the second law, as originally formulated, does not 
apply to open systems, only to closed isolated systems.  Open systems, unlike closed 
ones, are able to consume and exchange energy with the environment to keep going and 
maintain stability.   According to Schrödinger, because of this openness, living systems 
are organised to act, to do something; to live, to reproduce, to strive for survival. they 
exhibit recursive self-maintenance or, adaptivity.  Ultimately, living systems are 
organised to avoid thermodynamic equilibrium and strive for self-preservation 
(Bickhard 2004; Capra 1997; Collier 2000; Schneider & Sagan, 2005). 

As open systems with certain organisational features, living embodied organisms can 
resist entropy by actively importing "order" via energy-material exchange, from their 
environments into themselves.  Embodied self-constructed mechanisms, primarily in the 
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form of metabolic processes can then chemically transform these into useable fuel for 
the synthesis of biological important molecules.  "Disorder" is then exported in the form 
of waste products.  These far-from-equilibrium processes require continuous recursive 
adaptive interactions and transactions with the environment, in order to maintain the 
far-from-equilibrium conditions and cohesive identity.   

This adaptive recursive interaction is in aid of guiding energy into the dynamic 
organisational processes constituting the system.  This in turn serves to improve 
cohesive integration of systemic processes and the subsequently better coordination and 
adaptivity for diverse system needs and interactive possibilities.  This provides the 
system with a double circular (constructive/interactive) self-referential loop:  act to 
maintain cohesion and maintain and improve cohesion by acting. 

Bringing our autopietic and thermodynamic considerations together shows us that 
autonomy involves four central requirements.  Firstly, a relatively stable persisting 
processes, or system.   Such a system needs to have some degree of cohesion (not too 
strong but also not to weak either) in order to be sufficiently stable so as to be  a 
potential locus of autonomy.  It therefore "stands-out" from its medium as a distinct 
entity in its own right just like rocks and crystals but unlike gases.   

Secondly, unlike rocks and crystals, it requires a certain embodied (self-creating) 
intrinsic internal dynamics, a recursive circular cohesive organisation, which requires 
that it is constantly self-monitoring, self-maintaining and self-regenerating/self-
repairing, so as to offset deterioration and decay and be capable of reconstructing/
repairing its own components.   

Thirdly, in order for the system to evolve and develop in any significant manner, it 
requires a interactive/external dynamic loop, which enables it to actively seek out 
relevant resources by altering its self-maintaining methods and boundary conditions.  It 
can adaptively transform its boundary conditions to ensure the required flow of matter 
and energy  for functional integration and systemic cohesiveness. It needs to act on its 
own behalf.  
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Finally, it needs to produce its own semipermeable membrane which individuates it as 
the system it is.  Only by endogenously constructing a physical boundary, can the 
organisation of the system, the network of relations which constitute it as a distinct 
unity, be differentiated from its environment.  It is through the introduction of this 
membrane that a distinct inner medium is created.  However, as already argued in 
Chapter 3, these are not fixed or static.  Consequently, systems which meet these four 
requirement, are also strongly embodied. 

It is this particular type of embodied self-producing/self-maintaining system, capable of 
acting on its own behalf, which we shall call autonomous. Following Bickhard we can 
say that autonomy, by contrast with merely self-maintaining dissipative structures, is an 
embodied process of recursive self-maintenance (Bickhard, 2004, p. 24).  Autonomous 
system are capable of altering their methods of self-maintenance and are able to adjust 
responses flexibly to meet changing needs and opportunities on their own accord. 

Conclusion  
We argued that biological autonomy is a dual process of embodied self-construction and 
thermodynamic interaction. This differs from simple CAS, which can only maintain 
their organisation under a very restricted set of external conditions which it cannot alter; 
and more complex self-maintaining systems, such as  candle flames which do work to 
maintain the conditions that enable persistence, but cannot actively alter all its boundary 
conditions, it cannot actively seek out resources for self-maintenance, nor regenerate 
new components.  It cannot create more wax or move if oxygen supplies run low, but if 











Bio-Semiotic Cognition  

Introduction 
This chapter brings the various strands of this work together; I argue that strong 
embodiment provides us with a biological grounding for the integrated nature of 
organisms as intrinsically goal-directed purposeful agents in their own right as Uexküll 
argued.  We organise our discussion around four basic features which together are 
argued to constitute a bio-semiotic agency with the first signs of cognition.  We 
conclude by suggesting that the ability to read signs is the distinctive feature of 
cognition.  

1 Autonomy to Agency 
How do we get from autonomy to bonafide cognitive agency?  In the next few 
subsections we will present an account. 

1.1 - Relational Being 
What exactly is an agent so that it can exhibit agency and basic forms of cognition?    In 
order to connect the Uexküllian framework (which served as the basis of strong 
embedding) with the ideas on strong embodiment, and illustrate how together they 
constitute a basic MoC, I will frame my discussion around a recent proposal for minimal 
agency by Barandiaran et al (2009).  To this proposal I add a further requirement, which 
I will argue constitutes the minimal basis not only for agency, but basic cognition too.     19

Barandiaran et al (2009) identify three features required for minimal agency (see also, 
Di Paolo 2005; Barandiaran & Moreno 2008; Skewes & Hooker 2009).  Firstly, agency 
requires a (self-producing) system which is a distinguishable entity from its surrounding 
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!  This and the previous chapter, in varying degrees, draws heavily from three primary sources; autopiesis, 19
biosemiotics and the theory of recursively self-maintenance.  It is an underlying assumption here that 
certain aspects of all three theories can mutually compliment each other. Here I take some steps towards 
showing that self-maintaining systems can enrich autopoiesis as it places great emphasis on the 
thermodynamic active requirement of material systems.  While, biosemiotics can enrich both these views 
by showing how such systems use and require signs (which are rooted in the world) in order to maintain 
viability.  However, Bickhard (who introduced the theory of self-maintaining systems) developed his 
account in order to provide a naturalist account of representations, his conclusion is not advocated.  The 
synthesis presented here is aimed to be thoroughly non-representationalists.
medium.  Secondly,  this system needs to be capable of doing something by itself  and 
enter into an asymmetrical relationship with its environment.  Thirdly, the system does 
so according to goals or norms which are intrinsically its own.  To these I add a further 
requirement: that in order to be a fully cognitive agent, the system needs to be capable 
of reading signs.   Systems fulfilling all four requirements will be argued to be genuine 
cognitive systems and bear a MoC.    

In the previous chapter an autonomous systems was identified as a far-from-
thermodynamic-equilibrium open, recursively self-maintaining, self-producing network 
of processes which constitutes its own identity.  The question now is; how do we get 
from such a process to an agent capable of transforming information into meaning?  The 
first requirement is a self-generated system. 

The existence of autonomous systems, is a consequence of embodied processes of 
recursive self-production which constitute structure and generates a distinct entity.  Such 
systems, by virtue of their self-constituting nature and their subsequent intrinsic 
dependence on matter, individuate themselves from the environment they depend on. 
Such systems exists under "precarious conditions", because their existence will forever 
be under constant threat (Di Paolo 2009; Jonas 2001). We thus have the first 
requirement for agency, a self-generated system, and you'll note, the basis of strong 
embodiment. 

But, this identity construction, also brings with it an existential need to maintain 
structural cohesion in the face of external threats, and is the source of the asymmetry 
between system and environment.  To have a system-environment distinction of some 
kind, there needs to be a system to which we can attribute causal capacities, in relation 
to and as distinct from, its environment.  This situation appears to deem ontological 
priority to the side of the system (Thompson 2007).  The system creates itself as distinct 
from its environment and thereby is forced into an asymmetrical dependence with this 
same environment in order to maintain its identity (Hoffmeyer 1999).   

However, this is merely an appearance.  True enough, a system must create itself as 
distinct from its environment, and in this sense we can say that the system has an 
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"ontological priority" (Moreno & Barandiaran, 2004).  The system-environment 
interactions necessarily implies a pre-established system of some kind.  Nonetheless, 
this does not mean that the system is independent or cut-off from its environment. 
Indeed, thermodynamic requirements means the system is open, dynamic, fluid and 
fully interwoven into its environment.  Thus, rather than thinking of individual bounded 
units isolated from their environment, we have to think of these systems as historically 
guided processes of contingently unfolding relationships (Bateson 1979; Hoffmeyer 
2008). That is, as a process of relationally co-constituted and coordinated embodied 
action, who's being is one of unfolding motion, embodying the system's past through the 
present towards the future. 

The system, in creating its own identity, continuously defines itself in relation to its 
environment so that its identity is constituted by the web of interactive relationships it 
enters into, not by any of its intrinsic components nor its boundary.  The system's past, 
present and future interactions, defines its identity.  Therefore, the system cannot exist, 
cannot be what it is, without the environment and there is no environment without the 
system.  Importantly, "asymmetry" should not be read as, a privileging of the system 
over the environment.  All this implies is that, there needs to be a system of some kind 
first, which then can act in relation to the environment, but, only in acting thusly is there 
a system.  Here again we see the double circular self-referential loop necessary for 
autonomous existence. 

1.2 - Norms, Normative Function and Action 
But how exactly are we to understand the activities of such systems?  If the strong 
embodiment of autonomous systems grounds the ability to transform information into 
meaning, does this imply that bacteria, tics, frogs etc, are all agents capable of goal-
directed actions and cognition, as the Uexküllian framework implied?  The 
anthropogenic temptation will undoubtedly be to see nonhuman behaviour, as a hard-
wired instinctual reflex to environmental stimuli, a mere "thrashing about" not worthy 
of the terms action or agency let alone cognition.  As we saw, the inclination is to regard 
goal-directed actions as merely in the eye of the observer.  Indeed, if we follow A&A's 
proposed MoC, this is the expected conclusion. 
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Certainly not just any mechanical movements or mere "thrashing about", can count as 
action.  A ball rolling down a hill is not an agent, and even though "future-directed" we 
wouldn't want to say that it is a goal-directed action, nor would we call a Tourette's tick 
an action.  Similarly, mechanical devices such thermostats appear to have goal-directed 
functions.  Why are these "behaviours", which appear to be actively goal-directed, not 
actions?   Frankfurt (1997) notes that: "the problem of action is to explicate the contrast 
between what an agent does and what merely happens to him, or between bodily 
movements that he makes and those that occur without his making them".    

There are two connected strands to this articulation of the issue, one about actions the 
other about agents, taking them separately will be helpful.  The first has to do with what 
distinguish any given action as such (as apposed to mere thrashing about), the second is, 
what is an agent such that we can say it acts.  As we have seen, the traditional manner 
of accounting for this problem, also implicit in the above quote, is by taking adult 
humans as agents and introducing beliefs and desires cashed-out in terms of causally 
efficacious mental representations guiding action.  As Hutto & Myin (2013, p. 14) point 
out, "any bout of activity counts as mindful only if it is connected with contentful states 
of mind".   Naturally, only systems endowed with such states, are agents.  But if we 
want to avoid cognitivism, these symbolic human-specific modes of thinking cannot be 
our primary model for all action.  

The ideas developed over the last two chapters offers a more biologically inclusive and 
alternative means of grounding actions and agents. Recall that Uexküll argued that 
subjective agency  acts as the integrative mechanism for generating coherent action. 
Implicit in this proposal is the idea that an agent's identity is given by its own 
functioning, by what it does.  Using the ideas on autonomy proposed previously, we can 
understand action as the result of recursive self-maintenance, in relation to an 
environment.  Ok, but why exactly should we regard these as actions?  Because these 
observable activities are governed by self-generated norms.   

How exactly do these norms come about?  Autonomous systems develop and grow 
under intensely precarious conditions which are cause and effect of its worldly 
interactions. Thus a process, whether constructive or interactive, is functional if it 
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contributes to the global self-maintenance of the system.  These in turn become 
normative, by virtue of their integration into the overall dynamic organisation of the 
system, because constructive and interactive functional processes are ultimately 
responsible for the continued existence of the system itself (Christensen & Bickhard 
2002). The system exists because of what it does and what it does needs to positively 
contribute to its existence.   20

As the system is dependent on thermodynamic exchange with the environment, it will 
need to actively seek out food, shelter, warmth etc, if it doesn't it will lose its systemic 
cohesion and disintegrate.  The system has no choice but to actively compensate for its 
inherently decaying organisation.  It is precisely this precariousness which forms the 
basis of the normative character of the system's worldly activities.  So, by norms we 
mean that dimension of behaviour where value comes into play, so that activities 
performed by a system are good or bad, adaptive or maladaptive, appropriate or 
inappropriate, functional and dysfunctional for the system itself (Ruiz-Mirazo & 
Moreno, 2000; 2004)  

The system's self-constructed organisation imposes certain goals and norms and imbues 
these with intrinsic teleology.  Internal dynamics and functionality are thus necessarily 
connected to the maintenance of systemic cohesion and on-going development. The 
system acts/functions out of sheer existential necessity and is the active source of its 
own goals, norms and functionality.  Its own incessant need to maintain cohesiveness 
(identity), gives rise to intrinsic purposeful goal-directed action, to an immanent 
purposiveness.  The system has an end (self-preservation) and is teleologically 
structured (strives-to-do-so).  Such systems are endowed with intrinsic normative 
functionality (Bockhard 2009; Campbell 2010; Christensen & Hooker 2000; Christensen 
& Bickhard 2002; Collier 2002; Mossio et al. 2009; Saborido et al 2011).  
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!  Here I won't make any distinctions between the terms, "action", "normative functionality", "goal" and 20
"purpose" and will use them interchangeably.  While the term ‘function’ is more commonly used with 
regards to a body part or organ and ‘goal’ or ‘purpose’ is better used when talking about whole organisms, 
all four terms nonetheless express the (common sense) fact that X does F in order to G. Thus, all these 
concepts contain a teleological core, intrinsic to all recursive self-maintaining systems. it's this core which 
will be emphasised here.
Therefore, as Richard Campbell (2010) notes, what distinguishes an action from mere 
bodily movements is that, bodily movements are not goal-directed because they do not 
"aim" at anything in particular.  By contrast, actions are necessarily identified by their 
intrinsic ends, that towards which they do aim, they have a teleos. A Tourette's tick 
cannot be counted as action because it is not goal-directed or aimed at anything as such. 
While the "actions" of rolling balls and cybernetic mechanisms, are the products of 
external ascription and not intrinsic to the system itself.  Moreover, these activities all 
lack a further fundamental feature of normative goal-directed action, the ability to fail.   

Intrinsic normative functionality implies the ability to err, therefore, only systems 
possessing such functionality will be capable of making mistakes.  This is because, as 
we just saw, when autonomous systems perform actions which are inappropriate in their 
environment, they are inappropriate with reference to its own viability and structural 
integrity.  In other words, in accordance with intrinsic self-generated norms, which can 
success or fail for the system itself.  Norms are thus closely connected to the 
organisation of the system itself and what is or is not conducive to its own ongoing 
operations.  

To illustrate these point, consider Jonas's (2001) criticism against cybernetic teleology. 
Jonas's criticisms centres around the observation that a feedback loop, or any other 
regulatory mechanism (think of the thermostat again or Jigro), might provide a means to 
achieve a purpose but it will never originate the purpose itself (Franchi 2010).  As he 
points out, teleonomical machines merely accomplish the purpose of their users, not 
their own and as such they cannot make mistakes. Jigro does not fail when he cannot 
complete the jigsaw, nor does a thermostat err when it does not increase the heating. 
Cybernetic teleonomy conflates the basic difference between the existence of a purpose 
with its realisation. The same point equally applies to the EMH's notion of "coupled 
system". 

This explains why sensorimotor loops (or abstract functional organisation generally) 
are not sufficient for goal-directed actions, and indeed what is missing: autonomous 
agency.  But, why is this important, why can we not proceed simply by accepting 
teleonomic agency? The simple reason is that, teleonomic systems are not agents and for 
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this reason, not capable of genuine action or cognition.  They are only weakly embedded 
dyadic reactive systems unable to act on their own behalf. 

This ability to err, involves what Campbell (2011, chap. 4) calls, a capacity for "error-
detection". The system needs to be capable of differentiating between actions that 
succeed and actions that fail.  Let us illustrate the central idea further with an example 
of an autonomous system, a frog. 

A frog's capacity for making mistakes lies in its ability to recursively and differentially 
respond to future situations.  It cannot be “wrong” unless it is capable of adaptively 
adjusting its behaviour and learn, as best as it can, to control its circumstances.  In order 
to learn, however, it must have available alternate potential actions, and the ability to 
select among them. Without this capability there can be no sense of “choosing” 
appropriate (behaviour that supports viability) or inappropriate (behaviour which given 
the circumstances failed) behaviours for particular environmental conditions. Thus, 
when a frog flicks out its tongue in response to a moving pebble, its actions have failed. 

We are justified in calling the frog's behaviour a mistake, because its action can be 
“discovered to be wrong” by the frog itself.  Campbell (ibid, pp. 78-86) points out that in 
these situations the discovery might come in the form of a "surprise" or "discomfort". 
Surprise because it contradicts the frog's own expectations, expectations which stem 
from its need to be able to anticipate future conditions in relation to current 
environmental conditions.  To be surprised then, is to have anticipated, or extrapolated 
incorrectly; for the near-future to fail to align with the anticipation.  What makes an 
action normativily “wrong”, rather than merely a mechanical error, is that there is 
systemic malfunction related to the frog's internal autonomous dynamics. The frog has 
an intrinsic functional need that is left unfulfilled by some subprocess specifically taken 
by the frog to fulfil that function.   

Essentially the frog flicks its tongue toward the self-maintaining function of sustenance, 
for the purpose of eating and becoming nourished, which allows it to continue to carry 
out processes which contribute to its overall viability.  However, if it consumes a pebble, 
the function of flicking toward sustenance has failed, because it does not nourish the 
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frog.  The broader process of system self-maintenance is frustrated.  The system has 
failed in its self-maintaining processes (Campbell ibid, p. 80). For these reasons, the 
frog can be said to perform a genuine action; it is grounded on an intrinsic norm, it is 
goal-direct (it has a teleos) and is thus capable of failure. 

Note that goal-directed actions also implies deep integration as Uexküll advocated. 
From the autonomous perspective, actions can only be understood as the function of 
whole integrated systems, in relation to an environment and not of any of its 
subcomponents.  It is the entire frog that is goal-directed, that acts, not any of its 
components.  Indeed, only the activities (flicking out a tongue) themselves can be 
coherently regarded as succeeding or falling, not any of the various subcomponents 
involved in the process (Campbell, 2009; Hutto, 2011a,b).  Therefore, it is incorrect to 
attempt to reduce actions to a particular subcomponent, including mental states. 

In sum, recursive self-maintenance is a process driven by the self-generated purpose of 
maintaining identity, and is ultimately, an act of self-affirmation and self-reference with 
far reaching consequences.  Goal-directed actions emerge from self-generated norms, 
have a teleos and are  always, processes of self-reference.  This provides a way out of an 
observer dependant semantic ascription/teleonomy of the processes involved, because 
the failure to perform certain goal-directed actions conditions the very existence of the 
system itself.  Finally, it also meets requirements two and three for agency; recursive 
self-maintaining systems perform actions in accordance with self-generated norms. 
Therefore, genuine goal-directed action, need not only be the product of humans beings 
nor involve mental states. 

The last point is worth reemphasising: nothing like symbolic thought is required or 
involved in these processes.   Normative functionality need not be conceptual, though 
naturally it can be conceptualised.  Even though norms govern the interaction of the 
system, they are not necessarily explicit for the system itself. At a primordial level, 
many norms are implicit and not immediately capable of being explicitly identify by the 
system, though naturally for some systems they can be.  So, it matters for the frog that it 
finds the appropriate nourishment and does not go hungry or whether its environment is 
 81
hospitable or hostile.  To remain viable a system will have to take relevant action and 
there is no reason to think this involves anything like concepts. 

2 Agency to Bio-semiosis 

2.1 - Normative Function and Signs 
We began by stipulating that basic agency required four minimal condition; one 
fundamental piece remains missing for full blown agency and cognition. In the 
remaining subsections, I will argue that intrinsic normative functionality, needs to be 
understood as natural semiosis.  Embodied self-constitution leads to intrinsic 
normativity which leads to meaning, signification and value, which needs to be 
understood in terms of sign-function.  Values for a system, emerge with normative 
functionality in relation to the functional importance of particular signs for viability 
(Emmeche 2002).   

As Hoffmeyer (2008a, p. 65) states; "In the biological world, certainly, signs incite the 
generation of interpretants in the form of actions which are future-oriented, inasmuch as 
living beings always seek signs for survival and for reproduction".   Sign-function is 
then a fundamental part of the immanent purposiveness of autonomous systems.   To 
fully understand agency, the capacity to navigate the environments courtesy of signs, 
cannot be ignored.  

In Chapter 4 the Umwelt was characterised as a relational domain, a circular 
organisation constituted by functional cycles.  We briefly indicated that this model 
provided the three basic ingredients for semiosis; object, interpreter and sign,   With an 
enriched understanding of embodied agency (the interpreter), I now want to argue that 
this relational domain, the domain where information gets transformed into meaning, is 
fundamentally; a cognitive domain mediated by signs.  Echoing Pattee (2005, p.299), I 
suggest that, minimal cognitive systems can be distinguished from the non-cognitive by 
their intrinsic ability to use and dependence on, signs.  A basic MoC is thus identified 
with the capacity to read signs. 
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With this in mind, what I previously termed the "ability to transform information into 
meaning", will be recast as the ability to read natural signs.   Drawing inspiration from 21
the field of biosemiotics, I shall call recursively self-maintaining systems, which meet 
all four requirements for agency and cognition; bio-semiotic agents. This is to 
emphasises that such systems are; agents, traffic in signs and bear a MoC. Biosemiotics 
will provides us with a unifying conceptual framework for articulating this claim and 
bring the various strands together so as to conclude this work. 

2.2 - Biosemiotics 
Biosemiotics   is an emerging field of research, which rejects the passive nature of 22
current formal information-based approaches to the explanation of life and cognition.  It 
is primarily concerned with problems of meaning and semiosis from a biological and 
evolutionary perspective and how these emerge through active semiotic interactions.  It 
emphasises action in the origin of signs and investigates the roots of "language" in 
nature, highlighting the active role of the organisms which use these signs.   

A central thesis of biosemiotics, derived from Uexküll, is the idea that all living 
organisms engage in processes of semiosis (meaning-making)   and communication by 23
means of signs.  It studies how signs are used, produced, exchanged and come to have 
signification across the biological spectrum, both between and within living system.  It 
studies a range of diverse phenomena, from animal language through to molecular 
genetics (Barbieri 2003; 2007; Brier 2008a,b; Deacon 2012; Emmeche 2001;. Favareau 
2010; Hoffmeyer 1996; 2008a, 2008b; Kull 1998; Sebeok 2001; Wheeler 2006). Thus; 

Biosemiotics can be defined as the science of signs in living systems. A principal 
and distinctive characteristic of semiotic biology lays in the understanding that in 
living, entities do not interact like mechanical bodies, but rather as messages, the 
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!  The two ideas are pretty much the same thing, only now, I have more conceptual resources to refine the 21
notion of transforming information into meaning.
!  Unlike the majority of biosemioticians, I will not consider semiotics on microscopic levels such as 22
signalling between cells or organs, but only ecological semiotics as the study of semiosis in agent-
environment systems. Thus for the purpose of this work, I will follow Morris (1946) more narrow 
definition of semiosis as "a sign-process, that is, a process in which something is a sign to some 
organism".  As a consequence I do not address issues to do with the "semiotic threshold" (Eco 1976). 
That is, on the scope of applicability of semiotics, on the placement of the lower semiotic threshold.
!  In this work I use "meaning-making" and "semiosis"  interchangeably.23
pieces of text. This means that the whole determinism is of another type (Kull 
1999, p. 386). 

Therefore, all living systems (not just human brings) are not mere brute mechanical 
dyadic (cause-and-effect) processes, but rather, semiotic agents involved in triadic 
(agent-sign-object) interpretive meaning-making processes.   

Contrary to anthropogenic intuitions, organisms whose behaviour do not unequivocally 
involve human-style-reasoning cannot automatically remain outside the cognitive 
domain. Nor can we consistently regard the behaviour of these organisms as, teleonomic 
and predominantly composed of deterministic dyadic, inflexible, hard-wired reactions to 
environmental stimuli (Dennett, 1984; Gould & Gould, 1998; Sterelny, 2001).  From the 
biosemiotic perspective the biological world is best understood not solely in terms of its 
physical and chemical properties, but also as a world made up of biological signs and 
meanings with living systems as agents in their own right.   24

Semiotics deriving from Saussure has concentrated on cultural signs especially 
language.  Here the focus is on what a sign might be and on the essential arbitrary 
relationship between a sign and that which it denotes.  By contrast, biosemiotics mostly 
draws from the work of C. S. Peirce, which is seen to offer a broader conception of 
signs and semiosis.   In particular, meaning and signification is dealt with on the basis of 
a flow of embodied action.  This action is genuinely open and creative, making 
biosemiotics a natural framework on which to frame biological cognition (cf Favareau 
2006). 

The core concept for biosemiotics is the sign, so we need to understand how this 
concept is used.     Perhaps the most important thing we need to know about signs  is 25
that there are no such independently existing entities as “signs” as such, rather, there are 
only; "independently existing entities that are used as signs by the agents that act upon 
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!  Biosemiotics does not provide an account of agency as such, and it was for this reason we had to 24
introduce autonomy as a complementary means.
!  Note that signs are not symbols, though they could be.  Peirce identifies three types of sings; icons, 25
indexes and symbols. Indexes signify by having a direct connection to what they signify, icons signify by 
resemblance, and  symbols signifies by conventional association (Peirce 1955).  Most living organisms 
only use indexes while human arguably are the only creature which can use symbols.
them as such" (Favareau 2007, p. 69).  Thus the notion of a sign, cannot be understood 
apart from the broader concept of semiosis, whereby, A interprets B as "standing-for" 
C.  Thus understood, signs emerge through creative processes of semiosis, which; "is the 
sign process — the fundamental process that carries meaning and in which meaning is 
created" (Kull et al, 2011).  Semiosis is then a relational triadic process whereby 
something comes to stand for something ells to someone or something.  Importantly, 
signs are rooted both in the world and the agent, but not reduced to either. 

For example, footprints on the snow (sign vehicle) stands for something (the object), 
that a person has walked by.  Now, this can only function as a sign insofar as it is 
interpreted by a system (what Peirce calls the interpretant). Without an interpretation, a 
footprint is a mere mark.  Only when interpreted does it function as a sign and only 
through semiosis does the sign relation come into being.  In other words, the sign-
function has to be, implicitly or explicitly, recognised by some system, which in some 
sense instantiates the sign-function.  As understood in biosemiotics, signs are the natural 
constructions of biological organisms in the active pursuit of their own goals.  Because 
these are irreducibly relational triadic processes, they cannot be something which we 
can point at with the index finger, or reduced/identify with some objective thing or 
physical entity in the world even though they are rooted in the world (Deely 1990). 

Biosemiotics follows Peirce in recognising that semiosis involved three interconnected 
elements rather than two. Historically, sign relations had been conceived as a dyadic 
relationship between a signifier (that which stands for something ells) and a signified 
(the something ells).  Such a dyadic view remains influential both in analytic philosophy 
in the form of the correspondence theory of truth, and as we seen, in cognitive science in 
the form of the traditional information-processing models.  But through the lenses of 
biosemiotics, semiosis is understood as triadic processes whereby  aspects of the 
environment are taken as signs which are meaningful and significant for the organism 
and serve to guide behaviour.   

Given the triadic process (as apposed to static) nature of signs, their causality differs 
from the brute linear mechanistic (dyadic) causality of forces. While signs can be 
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ignored or misinterpreted forces exert causal power with mechanistic efficiency 
(Hoffmeyer 2008a).  Triadic sign process are perfectly physical causal processes, the 
difference is that they are nonlinear, dynamic, inherently agent-relative and context-
dependent. They do not depend on energy or mechanical force but on a flow of 
information as signs. Thus, signs are meaningful not because they act on agents 
causally, as an external force, but because they are taken by a particular system to mean 
something.  But is it not only human beings, with highly evolved linguistic systems, 
which use signs and partake in semiosis? 

For much of history it has been taken as a given that man is the only semiotic being, the 
only creature capable of appropriately reading signs.  Although semiotic processes are 
ubiquitous in the biological world, these are not acknowledged as such, but conceived in 
terms of meaningless mechanical forces/interactions of material substrates.  The work 
discussed in the previous chapters already cast some doubts on this conviction.  We can 
now appreciate that, even the "simplest" of living organisms, do in actual fact 
successfully use signs to guide their behaviour, rather than react mechanically. 
Ultimately, all organisms are agents who actively interpret and are guided by, 
meaningful signs in their surroundings. 

Essentially, biosemiotics follow Peirce in suggesting that the universe is perfused with 
signs which are not all exclusively a product of human minds but naturally occurring 
processes throughout nature.  Thus, the biosemiotic conception of signs and sign-
function, is committed to a universe populated by dynamical systems, actively taking 
part or engaged in, making sense of their surroundings via signs (Favareau 2006; 2007; 
2010; Hoffmeyer 2008a). 

2.3 - Bio-semiosis as Cognition 
We now have all the four required pieces of the puzzle which finally puts us in a 
position to complete our picture of cognitive agency and present a location-neutral non-
species-specific, non-cognitivist MoC.  

Any system which: "finds itself produced by itself is ipso facto a locus of sensation and 
agency, a living impulse always already in relation with its world” (Weber & Varela, 
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2002, p. 117).  Bio-semiotic agents are such systems; they create their own identities 
and have full responsibility for coupling with the environment.  In so doing, a relational 
cognitive domain constituted by sign relation - the Umwelt - emerges.   This domain is 
not pre-given in advance or independently of the system, but rather co-evolves and is 
co-determined (is brought into being) by the system through functional cycles which 
variously modulates its unfolding behaviour over time.  These functional cycles are not 
a mechanical dyadic (stimulus-response) coupling, but rather, historically unfolding, 
creatively open-ended, interpretive processes. They are interactive semiotic loops. 
whereby meaning and significations emerge through embodied interpretation.  All 
systems which read, interpret and understand meaningful signs, I argue, bare a basic 
MoC.  Note that this MoC is non-species-specific, non-cognitivist, and location-neutral. 

Connecting these ideas to normative functionality, we can now see that the capacity to 
maintain systemic cohesiveness, is semiotic and intimately dependent upon an ability to 
read and correctly interpret meaningful signs. Because the system has an intrinsic 
concern for its own existence, it is forced to act, but it only acts if it can create meaning 
as a means of coping and making a living in its semiotic world.  So emerges an Umwelt 
replete with meaningful natural signs, precisely at the junction where "insides" and 
"outsides" collide.  Signs are thus fundamental for goal-directed action as they serve to 
guide system's worldly activities. 

Therefore, from the most basic to the most complex, all bio-semiotic agents regulate 
their  functional cycles in such a way that a neutral world is transformed into a domain 
perfused with signification and meaningful signs.  What is "good" or "bad", "right" or 
"wrong" is defined by the system itself in triadic meaning-making processes, and not 
determined by brute mechanical force nor simply the ascription of an external observer 
(Hoffmeyer 1996; 2008a; Weber 2001a,b; 2002).  Nor is the ability to read and interpret 
worldly signs the exclusive privileged of sophisticated linguistic-based human activities, 
involving reasoning and inference. Rather, it is a natural embodied biological 
phenomena, varying in complexity and evident across the biological domain.  

It was for these reasons that we had to introduce an embodied and contextual, 
conception of information and which can now be recast as signs in semiosis by the 
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living.   From this perspective, signs do not exist "out there" in the world independent of 
bio-semiotic systems, ready-made and awaiting to be "picked-up", nor are they in the 
head, rather, these require an agent and emerge through interpretative triadic semiotic 
processes.  Signs are the difference that make a difference for a system.  Information is 
not observer-independent raw material but needs to be understood in the context of 
meaning and signs (Brier 2008a).  

Bio-semiotic agents are thus enmeshed in a world of signs, a world which they are 
required to read and interpret in meaningful life supporting ways.  The word "read" here 
is only partially metaphorical.  As highlighted by Sheets-Johnstone (2009), the 
etymology of read contains both the sense of "to discern" and "to discover the meaning 
or significance of something".  To which we can also add the sense of "to interpret".  If 
we follow this original meaning, reading need not be tied to human-specific symbol use, 
nor regarded as a misleading metaphor.  Adopting a "primordial" sense of the term, to 
read or interpret, can be understood as being deeply connected to the embodied non-
linguistic non-symbolic (know-how) activities of bio-semiotic agents in relation to what 
is significant for self-preservation.  Here meaning and doing become fundamentally 
inseparable and the meaning derived from these doings are not conceptual.  Meaning as 
signification occupies a continuum across a broad array of animate life.   Bio-semiotic 
agents live in a world that is already meaningful, but not necessarily because it requires 
explicit, symbolic, or representational modes of thought. 

Equally, "interpretation" is not used here in a metaphorical sense, but a literal one.  It 
might be objected that only language using organisms can be interpreters.  This is 
however an unsubstantiated anthropogenic bias response.   The work of Uexküll and 
biosemiotics coupled with the autonomy perspective, provides us with the right sorts of 
tools for understanding why other living organisms also need to be understood as 
natural interpreters.  The Umwelt is constituted by acts of selection, identification and 
appropriation by the organism.  Acts which undeniably have central characteristics of 
interpretation.  Any system capable of selectively discriminating salient aspects of its 
environment and selectively responding is engaged in interpretive semiosis. 
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Thus. at the most primordial embodied level, interpretation simply requires the ability to 
recognise something as something else. What an organism perceives, the particular 
objects in its Umwelt, are never perceived as neutral objects, they are meaningfully 
perceived as food, or as shelter or as something-to-climb-up.   If we can agree that bio-
semiotic agents use signs, then it seems to directly follow that the very process of sign 
use, is intrinsically an interpretive act.  

Consider a bacterium, for whom both sugar and saccharine function as signs, but only 
sugar is correctly interpreted as being nourishing.  Nonetheless both function as 
meaningful signs for the bacterium and guide its behaviour even though one is a 
misinterpretation (Markoš & Cvrčková, 2002).  At this primordial biological level, 
interpretation is simply "hermeneutics by the living" (Markoš 2002), an embodied 
ability which life forms, as agents in their own right, have for making sense of their 
world.    

Through evolved mechanisms, manifested through normative functionality,   system can 
interpret/misinterpret their world, not merely mechanically react.  For such systems, as 
we have seen, success or failure is not something ascribe from the outside by an 
observer but intrinsic to the agent itself.  Thus, due to this intrinsic normative 
functionality, the saccharine gradient does not cause the system to misinterpret that 
particular sign, but rather, interpretation being intrinsically normative, is by its very 
nature inherently prone to error.   

Interpretation and normative functionality can now be seen to be two sides of the same 
coin, with interpretation placing the subjective agency of the system at the forefront. 
Thus understood, an Umwelt can only emerge if the system does some interpretative 
work.  The system needs to be not only semiotically sensitive to relevant signs, but also, 
the active creator of meaning, in the sense of having to actively interpret (Hoffmeyer 
2007; Markoš et al. 2009; Stjernfelt 2007). Interpretation is thus an active open-ended 
creative process which always refers back to the self-maintenance of the system.  A self-
referential  process embodying the system's past through the present always guiding it 
towards the future. 
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Consider the frog again.  Let me conclude by suggesting that rather than claiming that 
the frog misrepresents flies (cf. Millikan 1984)  when it catches a pebble, it is more 
accurate to say that it misinterprets them. 

What exactly is the difference?  Misrepresenting is a property ascribed to the frog from 
the outside by some observer.  A property which can be ascribed because the observer 
has access to two separate domains; the frogs behaviour and the frog's direct 
environment.  A connection is drawn between the two and it is then inferred that it has 
misrepresented the environment in some crucial respects. But not for the frog!  From the 
perspective of the frog, there are no representation and thus no misrepresentation.  The 
frog reads a sign, because it is significant and imbued with meaning, but, which does 
not contribute to its own self-maintenance, it thus has misinterpreted the sign.  It is a 
misinterpretation, rather than a misrepresentation, because it is intrinsically related to its 
current state and overall identity, and as a consequence it cannot fail to have intrinsic 
meaning for the frog itself.  Thus the meaning of this sign is an action or response not a 
representation in the system. 

Therefore, the potential to be mistaken, to misinterpret signs, is an essential requirement 
for any purposeful behaviour and consequently full-blown bio-semiotic agency. This 
process is not instructed from the outside and intrinsically open to failure.  The frog can 
only misinterpret the pebble if it functions as a sign which can be interpreted.  And if it 
can be interpreted it can be misinterpreted.  Importantly however, this is still a 
purposeful meaningful action even though it is mistaken,  which interpretation it makes 
has significance for its viability.  This is more inline with our Uexküllian framework, 
which is more appreciative of the fact that the frog is a agent in its own right.  

Ultimately, signs, cognition, and interpretation are tightly interconnected. All bio-
semiotic agents have the ability to recognise signs, indeed cannot survive without them, 
and as such live in an inherently meaningful world and this is, I would argue, the 






In this chapter we have argued that there are four minimal requirements for a system to 
be considered an agent and minimally cognitive.  We argued that strongly embedded/

























From Extended Minds to Bio-Semiotic Agents 

1 The Extended Mind is Dead, Long Live the Extended Mind? 
In this dissertation, as an effort to develop a non-cognitivist non species-specific 
location-neutral  MoC, we presented a sketch of a framework which placed the notion of 
cognition at the centre of the biological domain. Drawing from biosemiotics and 
Uexküll, we argued that living systems are, not only deeply interwoven into the fabric of 
the world, but also bio-semiotic agents in their own right, who interpret signs for their 
own self-generated ends.    

We replaced an anthropogenic, individualist, information-processing approach, with 
triadic natural semiosis, stemming from the intrinsic autonomous dynamics of self-
maintaining systems.  Cognitive processes were reconceived in terms of complex 
relational interactions - functional cycles - of bodies intertwined within local 
environments through feedback, circular causality and signs. Cognition emerged from 
these irreducible interactive interpretative processes.  Ultimately; "there may be no 
meaning without cognition, and no cognition without meaning" (Sonesson 2009, p. 43). 

We proposed that interpretation provided organisms with the meaningful information 
required to survive. Bio-semiotic agents stay alive by adaptively interpreting and 
understanding the environment and taking into account the dangers and benefits of 
various kinds of external events and objects.  For this reason, we argued that we need to 
understand all meaning-making process as cognitive, involving some degree of 
knowledge and understanding.   Certainly not in the conscious human manner, but on 
the grounds that the organism knows-how to read the signs so as to make a living in the 
world. 

Because we did not posit internal mental representations connecting agents to the world, 
the distinction between cognitive processes and mental states, does not apply.   All 
higher forms of cognition, including linguistic and symbolic modes of cognition, 
emerge from these meaning-making processes (Hoffmeyer 2012).  
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All higher-level abilities require and depend on, a complex range of non-conceptual 
embodied skills, an embodied sign-mediated intentionality (Hoffmeyer & Kull 2003). 
These sign-mediated embodied skills deserve to be considered cognitive in their own 
right.  For the tic, as for a human being, to know, is to know what to do right now, at this 
very moment in this very context, in order to continue living. Through evolution, most 
of this knowing common to all life forms, has been sedimented into living bodies and 
Umwelten, thereby relinquishing the need for it to be solely the work of complex highly 
evolved brains.  Yet, this knowledge, forms the bedrock for symbolic/linguistic modes 
of cognition.  Complex human cognition, rests upon a basic cognitive bedrock that 
needs to be understood as non-representationalist, triadic sign-mediate processes first. 
From this perspective, we cannot separate the cognitive world into two neat domains, as 
the distinction is solely of our own making. 

Contrary to the EMH, cognition is not primarily human centred and spatially located but 
biological and relational.  It begins from the bottom-up with whole biological agents 
living in the world, there is no "gap" requiring filling.  Cognition emerges from the self-
organising biosemiosis of organisms in extended dynamic interactions.  Consequently, 
cognition cannot fail to be constitutively embodied and world-involving. 

While the underlying mechanisms causally enabling cognition are naturally essential, it 
is the interaction among these and not the mechanisms in themselves, that give rise to 
cognition.  While this may suggest that cognition is "extended", this is at best a 
misleading metaphor.  Even if some components are located externally to the agent, this 
does not therefore make cognition extended, nor "in the head" for that matter.  Rather, 
only the interactions between the various components give rise to cognition. As we 
identified cognition with triadic semiotic processes, cognition cannot be identified with 
the components of its constituting mechanism, be they internal or external.  Cognition is 
a relational process with no distinct location. 

Thus, questions of whether cognition is spatially located ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ a bio-
semiotic system, are rendered completely meaningless from this perspective.  Evidently, 
there are continuous dynamic semiotic loops, but cleanly no determinate location. 
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2 Looking Ahead 
The approach developed here has much in common with, and is greatly inspired by, 
enactivism (cf. Froese & Di Paolo 2011; Hutto & Myin 2013; Thompson 2007; Varela et 
al 1991). Particularly autopietic enactivism and radical enactivism as defended by 
Daniel Hutto. As autopietic enactivism draws heavily from phenomenology it places it 
in the anthropogenic framework, even though, it is at the same time committed to life-
mind continuity.  Primarily for this reason, I did not use the standard enactivism 
terminology and opted for the Uexküllian biosemiotics framework.  Moreover, I think 
central phenomena expressed by enactivism, such as sense-making, is inherently 
semiotic. While biosemiotics could also benefit from enactivism, particularly regarding 
the notion of mental representations, which remains highly ambiguous and in need of 
clarification. 

Given that biosemiotics has not been much discussed in cognitive science, nor 
enactivism much discussed within biosemiotics, potential theoretical benefits may be 
gained by considering the two together and exploring how they could mutually 
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